Trade and Domestic Production Networks*

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Abstract

We use Belgian data with information on domestic firm-to-firm sales and foreign trade transactions to study how international trade affects firms’ unit cost and the consumer’s real wage. We show theoretically that the gains from trade depend on domestic firm-to-firm linkages. Furthermore, we develop a tractable model of endogenous network formation, allowing firm-to-firm connections to form or break in response to import price changes. Quantitatively, we find that for small import price changes, alternative models that assume a roundabout production structure, despite falsely implying that all firms are connected within one link, yield similar predictions for the change in the real wage to the model that fits the actual linkages between firms. For large changes in the price of foreign goods, both the existing network structure and the endogeneity of the connections between firms are found to be quantitatively important.

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1 Introduction

Over the past few decades, the focus of research on international trade has shifted from countries and industries towards firms. This shift is in no small part due to the increased availability of firm-level transaction data on trade. One important insight from these data is that few firms directly import or export goods (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007). Even if firms themselves do not import or export, they may still buy from or sell to domestic firms that trade internationally. Capturing this channel, however, is challenging since domestic firm-to-firm transactions are rarely observed. In the absence of such data, quantification of the effects of foreign trade requires strong assumptions, such as a common intermediate good (Eaton and Kortum, 2002, and Blaum, Lelarge, and Peters, 2016) or the same import shares across firms within broad industries (Caliendo and Parro, 2015, and Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014).

The goal of this paper is to combine data on domestic firm-to-firm sales with information on foreign trade transactions to study how international trade affects the real wage and firms’ unit costs. Our analysis employs a detailed dataset of Belgian firms, which is based on several data sources that we have linked through identifiers. Annual accounts provide data on input factors and output, custom records and intra-EU declarations give information on exports and imports, and a value-added tax (VAT) registry provides information on domestic firm-to-firm transactions. Using these data, we empirically examine several new dimensions of firms in international trade before developing and estimating a model of trade and domestic production networks.

In Section 2, we describe the data, construct the domestic production (buyer-supplier) network of the Belgian economy, and provide new empirical findings on firms’ indirect exposure to foreign trade. Our data reveal that most firms are heavily dependent on foreign inputs, but only a small number of firms show that dependence through the direct imports observed in firm-level transaction data on trade. For example, in a majority of firms, at least 39% of input costs are spent on goods that are imported directly or indirectly. By comparison, exports are concentrated in a relatively small number of firms, even if one includes indirect exports through sales to domestic buyers which subsequently trade internationally. Furthermore, the production network is found to be sparse. The median number of domestic suppliers is equal to 33 and the median number of domestic buyers is equal to 9.

In Sections 3 and 4, we develop and estimate a model of domestic production networks and international trade. In our model, firms combine imports, inputs produced by domestic firms, and labor to produce differentiated products that can be sold either to households, other firms, or abroad. In Section 3, we assume a fixed network structure (i.e., the buyer-supplier links are exogenous). Firms endogenously decide their input purchases from their suppliers as well as how much labor to hire. We first show that the unit cost change for...
an individual firm due to a change in the price of foreign inputs depends on the share of
its input costs that is spent on goods that are imported directly or indirectly. Furthermore,
the change in the real wage depends on the firm-level cost increases weighted by firms’ sales
to domestic households. We then demonstrate that two economies with identical firm-level
domestic sales, imports, exports, value added, and intermediate good purchases, can have
different aggregate welfare outcomes in response to changing the barriers to trade. In other
words, firm-level outcomes observed in standard datasets without firm-to-firm transactions
are not sufficient to calculate the welfare gains from trade. The structure of how firms are
connected to each other matters in a small open economy because it affects how much of a
foreign shock is absorbed by the domestic economy.

We next assess the quantitative effect of domestic firm-to-firm production networks on the
usual gains-from-trade computations. To this end, we compare estimates from our model
with a fixed network structure to those we obtain using existing approaches that either
assume a common or industry-specific intermediate good. For sizable changes in foreign
price, we find that data on and modeling of the domestic production network is quantitatively
important for accurately measuring the impacts on production costs and real wages. By
comparison, for small changes in foreign prices the effect on real wages depends little on
whether we use our model with a fixed network structure or the alternative approaches.

We note that our results are not just a feature of Hulten (1978)’s theorem or the envelope
theorem applied to an efficient economy. First of all, due to mark-ups our economy is not
efficient. Second, we consider in the baseline a small but not infinitesimal shock to foreign
prices (a 10% increase). Third, and most importantly, we show that to apply the typical
Hulten (1978) formula to a small open economy to gauge the effects of a foreign price change
on real wages, even in an efficient economy, two adjustment terms would be needed: (a) the
response in the domestic wage, which is an equilibrium object that depends on the network
structure and affects the terms of trade; (b) the share of imports used directly and indirectly
in the production of exports, which again depends on the network structure. When we
apply the Hulten formula to evaluate counterfactual changes, we find its predictions to be
inaccurate.

While assuming a fixed network structure is convenient to take the model to the data, it
does not allow buyer-supplier relationships to change in response to trade shocks. In Section
4, we therefore develop a model of trade with endogenous network formation. In particular,
we let firms optimally choose their set of suppliers (i.e. the firm’s sourcing strategy) subject
to a buyer-supplier-specific fixed cost for adding a supplier. Allowing for endogenous network
formation is challenging for two reasons. First, firms face a large discrete choice problem of
which suppliers to include in their sourcing strategy. Second, firms’ sourcing strategies are
interdependent, creating a large fixed point problem: Firms take into account the expected
sourcing strategies of others in order to determine their own optimal sourcing strategy, all while knowing that other firms are thinking in the same way.

Building on Jia (2008) and Antras, Fort, and Tintelnot (2017), we overcome the first challenge by using lattice theory to solve firms’ large combinatorial discrete choice problems. To address the second challenge, we consider the formation of an acyclic network, postulating an ordering of firms and restricting the eligible set of suppliers to firms that appear prior to the buyer.\(^1\) While restrictive, this assumption allows us also to solve a model of firm trade with endogenous formation of domestic buyer-supplier relationships. After estimating the model, we use it to quantify how international trade affects firms’ production costs and consumer prices in a small open economy with and without endogenous network formation. We find that endogenous formation of buyer-supplier relationships tends to attenuate the costs of a sizable negative trade shock (i.e., a large increase in the foreign price) and amplify the gains of a sizable positive trade shock (i.e., a large decrease in the foreign price).

Our paper contributes to a growing literature on the economy-wide effects of foreign sourcing and the welfare gains from trade.\(^2\) The welfare gains from trade formulas derived by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) illustrate that the gains from trade are higher in models with intermediate goods than in models that abstract from intermediate inputs. Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) discuss that these are not the same economies from the perspective of the data, as the economy with intermediates has higher gross production compared to value added. In this paper, when conducting comparisons across models, we ensure that the commonly observed firm-level and aggregate outcomes are all held fixed. Models may differ in the implied linkages between firms. We illustrate theoretically that these domestic firm-to-firm linkages matter, and illustrate quantitatively that they affect counterfactual predictions for large changes to trade costs while simpler models can still yield useful predictions for small changes to trade costs.

Many studies use aggregate data only, relying on the assumption that firms’ import intensities are equalized. Using firm-level data on trade transactions, Blaum et al. (2016) show that accounting for heterogeneity in import exposure significantly affects the measurement of the gains from international trade. Their model assumes that firms can import directly and purchase a common intermediate good. Taking advantage of data on domestic firm-to-firm transactions, we relax the assumption of a common intermediate good and derive a parsimonious sufficient statistics formula for a model with a fixed production network. We also go beyond the fixed network structure, solving a model of endogenous network formation with

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\(^{1}\)See Spiegler (2016) for a recent contribution in economics studying belief formation in a directed acyclic network.

a finite number of firms and fixed costs for adding suppliers. This contribution builds on the global sourcing model of Antras et al. (2017). While they distinguish between final good and intermediate good sectors, we consider a more general input-output structure between firms. In addition, our model captures not only the firms’ decisions with respect to foreign sourcing but also their choices of domestic sourcing strategies.

Our paper also relates to a literature on the formation of domestic production networks. Oberfield (2018) develops a theory in which the network structure of production forms endogenously among firms that each purchase a single input. Lim (2018) develops a dynamic model of network formation in which each firm has a continuum of domestic suppliers. However, with a continuum of suppliers and buyers, the sales from one firm to another are negligibly small, and a link between two particular firms has no effect on aggregate outcomes. In contrast to these papers, we develop a model of endogenous network formation with a finite set of suppliers and incorporate both firm exporting and importing decisions. With a discrete set of firms, we are able to match granular firm-level outcomes such as the number of domestic suppliers and customers.

Finally, our paper relates to a literature that analyzes the propagation of idiosyncratic firm-level shocks. Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016), Boehm, Flaaen, and Pandalai-Nayar (2015), and Carvalho, Nirei, Saito, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2016) use natural disasters to study the propagation of shocks in production networks. Carvalho and Voigtländer (2015) analyze the adoption of inputs by innovators and the evolution of the domestic production network. Building on this empirical evidence, we extend the analysis of shock propagation to foreign
trade shocks and demonstrate that firms that are not directly exposed to international trade can still be significantly affected by changes in the price of foreign goods. While our theory assumes simple solutions for the pricing game between firms, Kikkawa, Magerman, and Dhyne (2018) explore the segmentation of markets for different buyers, with supplier firms having heterogeneous bargaining power in the supplier-buyer relationships. We additionally allow buyer-supplier relationships to change in response to these shocks and characterize how these extensive margins affect firm-level and aggregate outcomes.

2 Trade and production networks: Data and evidence

This section describes the data and documents firms’ direct and indirect exposure to foreign trade.

2.1 Data sources and sample selection

Our analysis draws on three administrative data sources from Belgium, accessible only at the National Bank of Belgium, for the years 2002-2014. These data sources can be linked through unique identifiers, assigned and recorded by the government for the purpose of collecting value-added taxes (VAT). Below we briefly describe our data and sample selection, while additional details are given in Appendix C.

The first data source is the Business-to-Business (B2B) transactions database. (See also Dhyne, Magerman, and Rubinova, 2015.) By law, all Belgian firms are required to file the annual sales to each buyer (provided the annual sales to a given buyer exceeds 250 Euro). Thus, the B2B dataset allows us to measure accurately the identity of the firms’ suppliers and buyers. The second data source is the annual accounts filed by Belgian firms merged with firms’ VAT tax declarations. These data contain detailed information from the firm’s balance sheets on output (such as revenues) and inputs (such as capital, labor, intermediates) as well as 4-digit (NACE) industry codes and geographical identifiers at the zip code level. In addition, the annual accounts include information about ownership shares in other enterprises. The third datasource is the Belgian customs records and the intra-EU trade declarations. These data contain information about international trade transactions.

in each year and for every firm. Both imports and exports are disaggregated by product and origin or destination.

One challenge with using the Belgian data is that the information is recorded at the level of the VAT-identifier. The problem is that a given firm may have several VAT-identifiers (for accounting or tax reasons). While organizational choices and transactions across units within a firm are of interest, our paper is centered on trade between firms. Thus, if a firm has multiple VAT-identifiers, we aggregate all data up to the firm level using information from the balance sheets about ownership structure. Details of the aggregation are outlined in Appendix C.1. In 2012, for example, the aggregation converts 896,000 unique VAT-identifiers into 860,000 unique firms. Of these firms, 842,000 had a single VAT-identifier. However, the 18,000 firms with multiple VAT-identifiers are important, accounting for around 60% of the total output in the dataset.

After constructing a firm-level dataset, we impose a few sample restrictions. We restrict our analysis to firms in the private and non-financial sector with positive labor costs, at least one full-time-equivalent employee, and positive output. Following De Loecker, Fuss, and Van Biesebroeck (2014), we also restrict our analysis to firms with tangible assets of more than 100 Euro and positive total assets in at least one year during our sample period. Applying these criteria reduces the number of firms significantly. In 2012, for example, only 98,745 firms satisfy the above criteria. The large reduction in sample size is mostly driven by the exclusion of local firms without employees (self-employment) from the sample (750,100 firms in 2012). These criteria also remove foreign firms with no local economic activity in Belgium from the sample. These account for a sizable fraction of imports and exports but have no domestic production activity in Belgium.

Table 1 illustrates that our selected estimation sample of firms provides relatively good coverage of aggregate value added, gross output, exports, and imports. However, total sales in our sample is larger than what are reported in the national statistics. The reason is that the output of trade intermediaries in the national statistics is measured by their value added instead of their total sales. We refer to Appendix C.2 for the same statistics for all Belgian firms and to Appendix C.3 for their sectoral composition.9

2.2 Direct and indirect exposure to foreign trade

The Belgian data allow us to construct the buyer-supplier relationships of the Belgian economy and therefore document firms’ direct and indirect exposure to foreign trade. While

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8Existing papers tend to ignore this issue, analyzing the data as if each firm has a single unique VAT-identifier. See e.g. Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014), Magerman et al. (2016), and Bernard, Blanchard, Van Beveren, and Vandenbussche (2016a)).

9In Online Appendix C.1 we outline the definition of each variable that we use in the analyses.
Table 1: Coverage of selected sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP (Excl. Gov. &amp; Fin.)</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>V.A. Sales</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>88,301</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>95,941</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>98,745</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All numbers except for Count are denominated in billion Euro in current prices. Belgian GDP and output are for all sectors excluding public and financial sector. See Appendix C.2 for the same statistics for the total economy. Data for Belgian GDP, output, imports, and exports are from Eurostat. Firms’ value added is from the reported values from the annual accounts. This reported value added is not necessarily the same as the value added measure used later in the quantitative analysis, which is the sales value minus imports and purchases from other Belgian firms in the sample.

The importance of intermediaries in international trade has been well documented (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott 2010; Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei 2011; Bernard et al. 2016a; Ganapati 2018), the linkages of domestic firms to these intermediaries are commonly unobserved.

We define firm $j$’s total foreign input share as the sum of firm $j$’s direct foreign input share, $s_{Fj}$, and the direct foreign input share of firm $j$’s suppliers, suppliers’ suppliers, and so forth, each weighted by the firm-pair-specific input shares $(s_{ij}, s_{ki}, ...)$:

$$s_{Fj}^{Total} = s_{Fj} + \sum_{i \in Z_j^D} s_{ij} \left[ s_{Fi} + \sum_{k \in Z_i^D} s_{ki} (s_{Fk} + \cdots) \right],$$

where $Z_j^D$ denotes the set of domestic suppliers of firm $j$, and the denominator of the input shares is the sum of labor costs, purchases from other firms, and imports. Note that the definition of the total foreign input share is recursive: A firm’s total foreign input share is the sum of its direct foreign input share and the share of its inputs from other firms multiplied by those firms’ total foreign input shares. While many firm-level datasets contain information about the direct foreign input share $s_{Fj}$, our data also offer information about firm-pair-specific input shares, $s_{ij}$. As a result, we are able to calculate the total foreign input share for every firm. We note that there is one inherent assumption in our definition of the total foreign input share: When a firm sells its output to multiple firms or final consumers, the foreign input share in the costs of producing these goods is assumed to be the same for all.

\[10\] A notable exception is Fujii, Ono, and Saito (2017) who use data on firm-to-firm linkages as recorded by a Japanese credit reporting company. The data suggest that 19% of manufacturing firms have a shipment to an exporting wholesaler. Another exception is Dhyne and Duprez (2017). Using the Belgian data on domestic firm-to-firm sales, they show that nearly all firms in Belgium are at most three links away from an importing firm, and about 65% of the firms are at most three links away from an exporting firm.
buyers (i.e., independent of the identity of the buyer).

**Figure 1:** Histograms of direct and indirect linkages to foreign trade

(a) Direct and total foreign input share

(b) Direct and total export share

**Notes:** Total foreign input share of firm $i$, $s_{Fi}^{Total}$ is calculated by solving $s_{Fi}^{Total} = s_{Fi} + \sum_{j \in Z_i} s_{ji} s_{Fj}^{Total}$ where $s_{Fi}$ is $i$’s direct foreign input share and $s_{ji}$ is $j$’s share among $i$’s inputs. Total export share firm $i$, $r_{iF}^{Total}$ is calculated by solving $r_{iF}^{Total} = r_{iF} + \sum_{j \in W_i} r_{ij} r_{jF}^{Total}$ where $r_{iF}$ is $i$’s share of exports in its revenue and $r_{ij}$ is share of $i$’s revenue that arises from sales to firm $j$. The figures are based on the analysis of 98,745 private sector firms in Belgium in 2012. The horizontal lines represent scale breaks on the vertical axis.
Figure 2: Size premium of direct and indirect linkages to foreign trade

(a) Foreign inputs

(b) Exports

Notes: The two figures display the smoothed values with 95% confidence intervals of kernel-weighted local polynomial regression estimates of the relationship between firms’ sales and their levels of participation in foreign trade. We use the Epanechnikov kernel function with kernel bandwidth of 0.01, pilot bandwidth of 0.02, degree of polynomial smooth at 0, and smooth obtained at 50 points. Log sales are demeaned with 4-digit industry fixed effects. The figures are based on the analysis of 98,745 private sector firms in Belgium in 2012.
In Figure 1a, we display a histogram of the total and direct foreign input shares of the Belgian firms. While only 19% of firms import directly, nearly all firms obtain some foreign inputs either directly or indirectly through domestic suppliers which use foreign inputs in their production process. Indeed, most firms are heavily dependent on foreign inputs, but only a small number of firms show that dependence through the direct foreign input shares observed in firm-level transaction data on trade. In the median firm, for example, the total foreign input share is 39%. While nearly all firms obtain some foreign inputs either directly or indirectly, the exposure to foreign trade varies substantially across firms. For example, the total foreign input shares are 20% and 58% at at the 20th and 80th percentile, respectively.

In Appendix D.1, we break down the direct and total foreign input shares by sector. Interestingly, foreign inputs are important in all sectors once one accounts for the indirect import. Even in the service sector, in which firms have little if any direct import, the median firm’s total foreign input share is as large as 24%. Breaking down the data by sector also reveals that indirect import is not entirely driven by firms obtaining foreign inputs through the wholesale and retail sector. As shown in Online Appendix D.2, even when excluding direct imports by the wholesale and retail sector (29% of aggregate imports) from the calculation of $s_{Fi}^{Total}$, most firms continue to indirectly import a significant amount of foreign inputs through purchases from their domestic suppliers. For example, the median firm’s total foreign input share is still as large as 18%.

Figure 1b performs a similar exercise but now looks at total export shares and direct export shares. We calculate the total export share of firm $j$, $r_{jF}^{Total}$, as the sum of the share of revenue of firm $j$ coming from directly exported goods, $r_{jF}$, and the share of revenue coming from goods sold to other domestic firms, multiplied by those firms’ total export shares:

$$r_{jF}^{Total} = r_{jF} + \sum_{i \in W_j} \left[ r_{iF} + \sum_{k \in W_i} r_{ik} \left( r_{kF} + \cdots \right) \right]$$

where $W_j$ denotes the set of domestic buyers of firm $j$ and the denominator of the export shares is the total revenue of the firm. Direct export is even more concentrated than direct

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\[11\] Note that virtually all firms are likely to use certain types of materials that are not produced in Belgium, such as gasoline. While we may not observe all these purchases due to the 250 Euro reporting threshold for domestic firm-to-firm transactions, the use of such inputs could help explain why nearly all firms (over 99%) in our sample are obtaining some foreign input directly or indirectly.

\[12\] In these calculations, we exclude the user cost of capital in the calculation of the input shares. The reason is that the firm-to-firm may include purchases of capital goods and, therefore, adding the user cost of capital from as another input cost could lead to double counting of capital goods. As a robustness check, we nevertheless included the user cost of capital in the calculation of the input shares, finding that in the median firm the total foreign input share is 35% (see Online Appendix D.1 for details).

\[13\] Specifically, $s_{Fi}^{Total}$ are computed by setting $s_{Fj} = 0$ for all firm $j$ in the wholesale and retail sector.
import, both on the intensive and extensive margin. While only 12% of firms export directly, 88% of firms export either directly or indirectly by selling to domestic buyers which subsequently trade internationally. In terms of trade volume, however, export remains relatively concentrated even after taking the indirect export into account. The total export share is only 2% in the median firm, whereas it is 14% at the 80th percentile. In Online Appendix D.2, we compute the total export shares when excluding any exports by wholesalers and retailers (which account for 18% of aggregate exports). Among firms in sectors other than wholesale or retail, the total export share is then 13% at the 80th percentile and 1% at the median.

Why does a majority of firms have significant indirect import but little indirect export? It is not reflecting a trade deficit in Belgium, as aggregate imports and exports are roughly equal. Instead, it reflects that most firms have a large number of domestic suppliers (i.e., indegrees) as compared to domestic buyers (i.e., outdegrees). While the first, second, and third quartiles of the indegree distribution are 19, 33, and 55, the quartiles of the outdegree distribution equal 2, 9, and 34. Hence the distribution of the number of buyers is much more skewed than the distribution of the number of suppliers, leading the majority of firms to have high indirect imports but low indirect exports. In Appendix D.2, we investigate the direct and total foreign export shares by sector. One sector that stands out is the service sector. While many firms in this sector rely on foreign inputs, relatively few export directly or sell to domestic firms that are exporting directly or indirectly.

Across a wide range of countries and industries, firms that directly export or import tend to be larger than other firms. A natural question is whether the positive association between firm size and international trade also carries over to indirect export or import. Figure 2 investigates this, calculating the average size of firms by direct and total foreign input shares as well as by direct and total export shares. We demean the log of firm sales using the firm’s four-digit industry average, so that a firm with log sales of zero is the size of an average firm in its industry. Figure 2 illustrates that average firm size is increasing in both direct and total foreign input shares. However, firms that import directly tend to be much larger than firms that buy foreign inputs through domestic firms. Indeed, firms with less than 60% in total foreign input shares are, on average, of similar size as the average firm in their industry. A similar pattern is evident for size and export. Firms with very high total export shares tend to be large. However, over most of the total export share distribution, there is only a weak relationship between firm size and total export share. Firms with a total export share of 60% are only about 50% larger than the average firm in their industry. Taken together, the results in Figure 2 suggest that firms do not have to be large to rely heavily on foreign inputs or to have most of their sales going ultimately to a foreign country.
3 Model with fixed production networks

We now develop a model of trade with fixed production networks and use it to quantify how international trade affects firms’ production costs and consumer prices. By fixed networks, we mean that the buyer-supplier links are exogenous. Given these links, firms decide how much to buy from and sell to the existing suppliers and buyers. While the assumption of exogenous buyer-supplier links is admittedly strong, it allows us to derive several analytical results and it makes it convenient to take the model to the data.

3.1 Model

To match our data from Belgium, we consider a small open economy. Before describing the model, we briefly discuss the notation. Since there exist many bilateral directed flows in our model, we will often have two subscripts. In such cases, the first subscript denotes the origin of the good, and the second subscript denotes the destination of the good.

3.1.1 Preferences and Demand

Each consumer supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Consumers are assumed to have identical, homothetic CES preferences over consumption goods:

\[ U = \left( \sum_{k \in \Omega} \left( \beta_{kH} q_{kH} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \tag{3} \]

where \( \Omega \) denotes the set of available products in the small open economy, \( k \) denotes a product, and \( H \) denotes domestic final demand from households. Since all consumers have the same homothetic CES preferences for consumption, we can write the aggregate final consumer demand (in quantities) for product \( k \), given price \( p_{kH} \), as:

\[ q_{kH} = \beta_{kH}^{\sigma-1} \frac{p_{kH}^{\sigma}}{P^{1-\sigma}} E, \tag{4} \]

where \( E \) denotes the aggregate expenditure in Belgium, and \( P \) denotes the domestic consumer price index:

\[ P = \left( \sum_{j \in \Omega} \beta_{jH}^{\sigma-1} \frac{1}{p_{jH}^{1-\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}. \tag{5} \]

We assume that final goods are substitutes, and therefore \( \sigma > 1 \).

Demand from abroad for product \( k \) takes a similar functional form:
\[ q_{kF} = \beta_{kF}^\sigma \frac{P_{kF}^\sigma}{P_F^{1-\sigma}} E_F, \]

where \( \beta_{kF} \) is a product-\( k \)-specific foreign demand shifter, \( p_{kF} \) is the price of product \( k \) abroad, and \( P_F \) and \( E_F \) denote the foreign price index and expenditure, respectively.

### 3.1.2 Market structure and production

Firms produce single products. We will use \( i, j, k \) to index firms or products. The products are differentiated across firms. Firms sell the same product to final consumers and to other firms as an intermediate input, though not all firms sell to other firms, and not each pair of firms has a buyer-supplier relationship. Note that we allow Belgian firms to sell directly to foreign consumers, while all foreign products reach Belgian consumers indirectly through the importing of inputs by Belgian firms.

When selling to households, we treat every firm as infinitesimal and assume monopolistic competition. Firms then charge a constant mark-up over marginal costs, \( \mu = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \). When selling to other firms, the assumption of infinitesimal size is no longer reasonable, since most firms just have a few selected suppliers. We assume that in the Nash bargaining between buyer and supplier, the buyer has the full bargaining power. Given the assumptions on technology described below, this will imply that the supplier sells at marginal cost to the buyer firm. Note, however, that our theoretical results for the model with a fixed network structure do not change if firms charge positive and possibly heterogeneous mark-ups to buyer firms as long as these are fixed. The assumption of the bargaining power in firm-to-firm transactions being on the buyer’s side is convenient for modeling the network formation in a tractable manner in Section 4.

In this section we assume a fixed network structure, meaning that we take as given the set of firms, \( Z_j \), from which each firm \( j \) is eligible to purchase inputs. For importing firms, \( Z_j \) contains also foreign, \( F \), as an eligible supplier. Sometimes we will refer to the set of domestic suppliers of firm \( j \), which we denote by \( Z_j^D \). In order to sell abroad, firms incur iceberg transport costs, \( \tau \). In this section, we take export participation, \( I_{jF} \), as given (\( I_{jF} = 1 \) for all exporting firms and \( I_{jF} = 0 \) otherwise) and endogenize it in Section 4.

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14The assumption that foreign goods reach Belgian consumers only through Belgian firms is reasonable because in the data nearly all imports are carried out by firms. We make the assumption that Belgian firms can reach foreign consumers directly to avoid modeling foreign firms in detail.

15Positive and fixed mark-ups by firms would only affect the system of equations in the Online Appendix to calculate the change in the domestic wage. See Kikkawa et al. (2018) for a model of trade with fixed production networks and variable firm-to-firm mark-ups.

16Also in the industrial organization literature, corner solutions in the bargaining game are sometimes assumed to obtain tractable solutions for network formation problems. For example, when studying the determinants of the hospital networks offered by health plans, Ho (2009) assumes that hospitals make take-it-or-leave-it offers to all health plans in the market.
Firms use a CES input bundle of workers and domestic and foreign inputs with elasticity of substitution $\rho > 1$ in the production function. We assume that $\sigma > \rho$, implying that consumers are more price-elastic than firms in their purchase of goods. Given the CES production function, we can write the unit cost function of firm $j$ as:

$$c_j(Z_j) = \frac{1}{\phi_j} \left( \sum_{k \in Z_j} \alpha_{kj}^{\rho-1} p_{kj}^{1-\rho} + \alpha_{Lj}^{\rho-1} w_j^{1-\rho} \right)^{1/(1-\rho)}. \quad (7)$$

The first term in the cost function, $\phi_j$, denotes the exogenous total factor productivity of firm $j$. Inside the parentheses, the term $\alpha_{kj}$ reflects how salient the good produced by supplier $k$ is as an input for firm $j$, and $p_{kj}$ denotes the price that supplier $k$ charges for its input to firm $j$. Furthermore, the term $\alpha_{Lj}$ captures the importance of labor input for firm $j$, and the price of labor is denoted by $w$.

### 3.1.3 Firm behavior and dependence on foreign inputs

The share of variable costs by firm $j$ that is spent on intermediate inputs produced by firm $k \in Z_j$ is:

$$s_{kj} = \frac{p_{kj} q_{kj}}{c_j q_j} = \frac{\alpha_{kj}^{\rho-1} p_{kj}^{1-\rho}}{\Theta_j(Z_j)}, \quad (8)$$

where $\Theta_j(Z_j) = \sum_{k \in Z_j} \alpha_{kj}^{\rho-1} p_{kj}^{1-\rho} + \alpha_{Lj}^{\rho-1} w_j^{1-\rho}$ denotes the sourcing capability of firm $j$, and $Z_j$ denotes the sourcing strategy of firm $j$, following the terminology of Antras et al. (2017).

Firm $j$ spends a larger fraction of variable costs on inputs produced by firm $k$ if the saliency term $\alpha_{kj}$ is large or the price $p_{kj}$ is low, relative to its sourcing capability. Analogously, the share of variable costs by firm $j$ that is spent on labor is:

$$s_{Lj} = \frac{w L_j}{c_j q_j} = \frac{\alpha_{Lj}^{\rho-1} w_j^{1-\rho}}{\Theta_j(Z_j)}, \quad (9)$$

while the direct foreign input share of firm $j$ (assuming $F \in Z_j$) is:

$$s_{Fj} = \frac{p_{Fj} q_{Fj}}{c_j q_j} = \frac{\alpha_{Fj}^{\rho-1} p_{Fj}^{1-\rho}}{\Theta_j(Z_j)}. \quad (10)$$

Based on the firm-pair-specific input share, $s_{kj}$, the direct foreign input share, $s_{Fj}$, and the set of domestic suppliers, $Z_j^D$, we are able to calculate the total foreign input share, $s_{Fj}^{total}$, defined in equation [1]. The total foreign input share summarizes the exposure of firms to foreign inputs and is intuitive in a model with single product firms in which each firm uses the same fraction of foreign inputs in the good sold to every buyer. Proposition [1].
shows that the total foreign input share is useful for calculating the firm-level cost change in response to a change in the foreign input price. Let $z'$ denote the value for any variable $z$ after an exogenous shock and $\hat{z} = \frac{z'}{z}$ denote the change in variable $z$.

**Proposition 1 (Cost changes in response to foreign price changes)**

*Given fixed linkages between firms, the change in firm $j$'s unit cost, $\hat{c}_j | \hat{p}_F$, given an uniform change in foreign price, $\hat{p}_F$, is*

$$
\hat{c}_j | \hat{p}_F = \left( 1 - s^{Total}_{Fj} \right) \hat{w}^{1-\rho} + s^{Total}_{Fj} \frac{\hat{p}_F}{\hat{p}_F} \right)^{1/(1-\rho)}.
$$

(11)

*For a small percentage point change in the foreign price, $\frac{dp_F}{p_F}$, the first-order approximation to firm $j$’s unit cost is*

$$
\frac{dc_j}{c_j} = \left( 1 - s^{Total}_{Fj} \right) \frac{dw}{w} + s^{Total}_{Fj} \frac{dp_F}{p_F}.
$$

(12)

For both large and small changes to the foreign price, the changes in the firm-level cost are a weighted aggregate of the change in the foreign price and the change in the domestic wage. The change in the domestic wage is determined by the equilibrium, as described below. The weights are firm-specific and summarized by the the firm’s total foreign input share.$^{17}$

As can be seen from equation (1), a firm’s cost will not only change according to its own direct foreign input share, but also according to its suppliers’ foreign input shares, suppliers’ suppliers’ foreign input share, and so forth. Note that we leveraged the assumption that there is perfect pass-through of any cost changes along the production chain.$^{18}$ For large changes to the foreign price, the elasticity of substitution in the production function, $\rho$, indicates how easy it is to switch to alternative inputs, including labor. Given the observed total foreign input share, a lower value of $\rho$ leads to a larger cost increase from an increase in the foreign price. In the extreme case when the foreign price change is infinite and the economy goes to autarky, the change in firm-level cost becomes $\hat{c}_j | p_F \to \infty = \left( 1 - s^{Total}_{Fj} \right)^{1/(1-\rho)} \hat{w}^{\text{aut}}$, where $\hat{w}^{\text{aut}}$ denotes the change in the domestic wage when going to autarky. For small changes to the foreign price, the first-order approximation to the firm’s cost change does not depend on the elasticity of substitution. Furthermore, we show in the proof that the result in equation (12) holds more generally for any constant returns to scale production function. While Proposition 1 considers a uniform change in the foreign price, we derive expressions

$^{17}$Equivalently, we could express the cost change using the firm’s total labor input share: $s^{Total}_{Lj} = 1 - \sum_{i \in Z} \sum_{j \in Z} s_{ij} s^{Total}_{Li}$. $^{18}$Note that we would derive the same equation under positive, but constant, firm-to-firm mark-ups. However, the equilibrium change in $\hat{w}$ would be different in such a model. See Kikkawa et al. (2018) for results on cost changes under pair-wise variable mark-ups.
for firms’ cost changes when the import price changes are heterogeneous across firms, \( \{ \hat{p}_{Fj} \} \)
in Online Appendix A.1.\(^{19}\)

### 3.1.4 Firm-level sales and profits

Firms’ total sales consist of the sum of domestic sales to final consumers, foreign sales to final consumers, and domestic sales to other firms. Let firm \( j \)’s total sales be denoted by:

\[
x_j = \beta_j \sigma^{-1} \mu_j \sigma^{-1} \Theta_j (Z_j)^{(\sigma-1)/(\rho-1)} \frac{E}{P_1^{1-\sigma}} + I_{jF} \beta_j \sigma^{-1} \mu_j \sigma^{-1} \Theta_j (Z_j)^{(\sigma-1)/(\rho-1)} \tau^{1-\sigma} \frac{E_F}{P_F^{1-\sigma}} \\
+ \sum_{k} I(j \in Z_k) \phi_j^{-1} \alpha_{jk} \Theta(j) \frac{x_k/\mu_k}{\Theta_k(Z_k)},
\]

where \( \mu_k \) denotes the average mark-up of firm \( k \). Recall that the firm charges a constant mark-up to final consumers and a zero mark-up to other firms. Hence, \( \mu_k \) depends on the distribution of firm \( k \)’s sales.

Given that firms make their profits only on sales to final consumers, we can write the variable profits of firm \( j \) given a sourcing strategy, \( Z_j \), and export participation, \( I_{jF} \), as

\[
\pi_{j, \text{var}}(Z_j, I_{jF}) = \frac{1}{\sigma} \beta_j \sigma^{-1} \mu_j \sigma^{-1} \Theta_j (Z_j)^{(\sigma-1)/(\rho-1)} \frac{E}{P_1^{1-\sigma}} \\
+ I_{jF} \beta_j \sigma^{-1} \mu_j \sigma^{-1} \Theta_j (Z_j)^{(\sigma-1)/(\rho-1)} \tau^{1-\sigma} \frac{E_F}{P_F^{1-\sigma}}.
\]

### 3.1.5 Aggregation and equilibrium

We now describe the aggregation of our model, discuss how firm profits are redistributed to consumers, define the equilibrium, and discuss the determination of the domestic wage change in response to any foreign price change. In the model with a fixed production network, we abstract from fixed costs of linkage formation, and hence \( \pi_j = \pi_{j, \text{var}} \).\(^{20}\)

We assume that the set of Belgian firms is fixed and that firm profits are distributed to workers in Belgium. We consider Belgium as a small-open economy — i.e., foreign ex-

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\(^{19}\)Consider arbitrary changes in the import price at the firm-level, \( \{ \hat{p}_{Fj} \} \). Firm-level cost changes given these shocks can be expressed as \( \hat{c}_j^{1-\rho} = (1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{total}}) \hat{w}_j^{1-\rho} + t_{Fj} \), where \( t_{Fj} \) is computed from \( t_{Fj} = s_{Fj} \beta_j^{1-\rho} + \sum_{i \in Z_j} s_{ij} t_{Fj} \), and \( \hat{w} \) is computed from the system of equations presented in Online Appendix A.1. In this system of equations, we also allow for arbitrary changes in export demand at the firm-level, \( \{ \beta_{jF} \} \).

\(^{20}\)Note that the counterfactual results are identical even in the presence of fixed costs, as long as the network structure is fixed.
penditure, $E_F$, foreign price index, $P_F$, and a set of prices by foreign suppliers, $\{p_{Fj}\}_j$, are exogenous. We further assume that there are no foreign asset holdings and that trade is balanced. Hence aggregate household expenditure in Belgium is given by

$$E = wL + \sum_k \pi_k.$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

Balanced trade implies that aggregate exports are equal to aggregate imports:

$$\sum_j I_j \beta_j \sigma_{Fj} \mu_j \theta_j (Z_j)^{(\sigma-1)/(\rho-1)} \rho_{1-\sigma} = \sum_j \frac{1}{\mu_j} s_{Fj} x_j.$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

Labor market clearing implies that labor income is equal to firms’ labor costs:

$$wL = \sum_j \frac{1}{\mu_j} s_{Lj} x_j.$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

The equilibrium for the small open economy is defined as follows.

**Definition 1 (Equilibrium given a fixed network structure)**

*Given foreign expenditure, $E_F$, foreign price index, $P_F$, and a set of prices by foreign suppliers, $\{p_{Fj}\}_j$, an equilibrium for the model with a fixed network structure and fixed export participation is a wage level, $w$, price index for the consumer, $P$, and aggregate expenditure, $E$, such that equations (5), (7), (8), (9), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (17) hold.*

Using the system of equations in the above definition and the result in Proposition 1, we describe the system of equations to determine the change in the nominal wage for a foreign price change in Online Appendix A.3 while Online Appendix A.4 contains the analogous system of equations under first-order approximation.

In order to describe the change in the real wage, it will be useful to define the share of household consumption that is produced by firm $i$, $s_{iH}$:

$$s_{iH} = \frac{p_{iH} q_{iH}}{E} = \frac{\beta_{iH}^{(\sigma-1)} \rho_{iH}^{1-\sigma}}{\rho^{1-\sigma}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

Given this definition, the change in the real wage for a uniform foreign price change can be summarized as follows:

**Proposition 2 (Real wage change in response to foreign price changes)**

*Given fixed linkages between firms, the change in the real wage, $\frac{\hat{w}}{P}$, due to an uniform*
change in foreign price, \( \hat{p}_F \), is:

\[
\frac{\hat{w}}{\hat{P}} |_{\hat{p}_F} = \hat{w} \left( \sum_i s_i H \left( \hat{c}_i | \hat{p}_F \right)^{1-\sigma} \right) \frac{1}{\sigma-1} \\
= \left( \sum_i s_i H \left( (1 - s_i H T_{Total}) + s_i H T_{Total} \hat{p}_F \right)^{1-\rho} \frac{1}{\sigma-1} \right). \tag{19}
\]

For a small percentage point change in the foreign price, \( \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \), the first-order approximation to the change in the real wage is:

\[
\frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dP}{P} = \frac{dw}{w} - \sum_j s_j H \frac{dc_j}{c_j} = \left( \frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \right) \sum_j s_j H T_{Total} \frac{1}{\sigma-1}. \tag{20}
\]

The change in the real wage is given by the change in the domestic nominal wage and a weighted aggregate of firms’ cost increases, with the weights equal to the firms’ share in domestic household demand, \( s_i H \). In the extreme case where the foreign price change is infinite and the economy goes to autarky, the change in the real wage becomes \( \frac{\hat{w}}{\hat{P}} |_{\hat{p}_F \to \infty} = \left( \sum_i s_i H \left( 1 - s_i H T_{Total} \right)^{1-\rho} \right)^{1/(\sigma-1)} \). When going to autarky, the change in the nominal wage doesn’t have to be calculated since it cancels out. Moreover, we provide equations for calculating the change in real income in Online Appendix A.5. The first-order-approximation to the change in the real wage in equation (20) holds for a wider class of production and utility functions, provided that they are homogeneous of degree one.

The above proposition highlights the importance of the change in the nominal wage, the firms’ shares in domestic household demand, and the firms’ total foreign input shares in calculating the real wage changes in response to a foreign price shock. In general, computing these statistics require knowledge (or strong assumptions) about the network structure. This contrasts with the result from Hulten (1978) for a closed economy, which states that for an efficient economy, and under some technical conditions, the knowledge of the network structure becomes redundant in making aggregate counterfactual predictions up to a first-order approximation.

Applying Hulten’s insights to a small open economy, one may consider exports as inputs

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\( ^{21} \)Furthermore, we show in Online Appendix A.2 that analogous results to Propositions 1 and 2 can be obtained under the assumption of a continuum of firms.

\( ^{22} \)Hulten’s theorem states that the change in aggregate real consumption, \( C \), can be expressed as \( \frac{dC}{C} = \sum_s \frac{\text{Output}_s}{VA} \frac{dA_s}{A_s} \), where \( \frac{dA_s}{A_s} \) denotes the change in TFP of sector \( s \).
and imports as outputs of a “foreign sector.” To calculate the percentage change in the real wage of a small open economy, one would compute the product of the foreign sector’s Domar (1961) weight, aggregate imports over aggregate value added, and the percentage change in the foreign sector’s productivity. The change in the foreign sector’s productivity can be captured by the change in the terms-of-trade (i.e., the change in the price of exports minus the change in the price of imports). Therefore, under perfect competition, the change in the real wage expressed in equation (20) becomes equivalent to the expression:

\[
\frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dP}{P} = \text{Imports} \cdot \text{Domar weight} \left( \sum_j s_{jF} \left( 1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \right) \frac{dw}{w} + s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \right) - \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \frac{dP}{P} \to\]

\[
\frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dP}{P} = \text{Imports} \cdot \text{Domar weight} \left( \sum_j s_{jF} \left( 1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \right) \frac{dw}{w} + s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \right) - \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \frac{dP}{P} \to\]

\[
\frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dP}{P} = \text{Imports} \cdot \text{Domar weight} \left( \sum_j s_{jF} \left( 1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \right) \frac{dw}{w} + s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \right) - \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \frac{dP}{P} \to\]

\[
\frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dP}{P} = \text{Imports} \cdot \text{Domar weight} \left( \sum_j s_{jF} \left( 1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \right) \frac{dw}{w} + s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \right) - \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \frac{dP}{P} \to\]

where \(s_{jF}\) is firm \(j\)’s export share in total exports. See Appendix A.3 for the derivation.

Equation (21) states that the ratio of imports over value added and the change in the foreign price are not sufficient in computing the change in the real wage in an open economy, even under perfect competition. There are two adjustment terms needed: the response of the domestic wage, \(\frac{dw}{w}\), and the domestic content in exports, \(\sum_j s_{jF} \left( 1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \right)\). These terms are needed because not all foreign shocks are absorbed domestically in a small open economy. And to compute these terms, knowledge about the network structure is required.

Our results imply that one can find different aggregate effects from foreign price changes across two economies with the same elasticities of substitutions in production and in the utility functions and the same levels of aggregate imports and exports, GDP, and gross production. In fact, even all firm-level outcomes on domestic sales, imports, exports, value added, and intermediate good purchases can be identical, and the aggregate effects can still be different. We illustrate this in a simple numerical example in Appendix B and discuss this further in the quantitative application with the Belgian data in Section 3.3.

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23 This example is related to the discussion in Melitz and Redding (2014) that the gains from trade can be arbitrarily large in a model with sequential production as the number of stages of production increases. However, note that the ratio of gross production to GDP also rises in their example as the number of stages gets larger. Here we hold the level of gross production and GDP fixed and illustrate that the gains from trade can still differ.

19
3.2 Alternative approaches and data requirements

As we have shown above, the structure of the domestic production network is relevant for measuring changes of firm-level cost, real wages, and real income in response to a foreign price shock. Below, we describe several alternative approaches that have lower data requirements.

3.2.1 Back of the envelope calculation for an efficient economy

One may want to use the analogue of Hulten’s theorem for a small open economy in equation (21) to calculate a first-order approximation to the change in real wages, assuming that the economy is efficient. As discussed above, the network structure is still needed to compute several of the terms in this equation. Here we discuss additional simplifying assumptions to approximate the term $\sum_j s_j F_j (1 - s_{Total} F_j)$. If one assumes no import content in the production of exports, then $\sum_j s_j F_j (1 - s_{Total} F_j)$ is equal to 1. Alternatively, if one assumes perfect competition and the import content being the same in both exports and domestic final demand, then $\sum_j s_j F_j (1 - s_{Total} F_j)$ becomes $\frac{VA}{VA + Exports}$.

This approach nevertheless only will yield to a back-of-the-envelope calculation as it ignores the change in the domestic wage, $\frac{dw}{w}$, which adjusts differently depending on the network structure.

3.2.2 Roundabout production economies

In the absence of firm-level data on the structure of the domestic production network, researchers can approximate linkages between firms, for example, by assuming a simple roundabout production economy or by using sectoral input-output tables. Importantly, these assumptions will lead to different predictions for $s_{IH}$ and $s_{Total F_i}$, which are not observed in standard data sets.

While we lay out the key difference in the assumptions here, we describe the changes in firm-level cost, real wage, and real income analogous to Propositions 1 and 2, in addition to the full set of equilibrium equations, for these alternative models in Online Appendices A.3, A.4, and A.5.

Simple roundabout production economy

The seminal work by Eaton and Kortum (2002) assumes that goods are produced with labor input and a composite good that is used as an intermediate (and also equal to the final good consumption bundle). While their model assumes that the production function is

\[ \text{See Appendix A.4 for the derivation. Consistent with De Gortari (2017), we find in Online Appendix D.3 that the import content in exports tend to be different from that in domestic final demand for all sectors. In particular, we find that in the manufacturing sector the import content in exports is much larger than that in domestic final demand.} \]

\[ \text{Researchers with access to firm-level data usually observe domestic sales and exports, but not the split of the domestic sales between sales to households and sales to other firms. The sales to households are important for calculating } s_{IH} \text{ and the sales between firms are important for calculating } s_{Total F_i}. \]
Cobb-Douglas in labor and intermediates, we stay close to the functional form in equation (7) and capture the roundabout approach by assuming a production function that leads to the following cost function for firm $j$:

$$c_j = \phi_j^{-1} \left( \alpha_{Dj}^{\rho-1} P_1^{1-\rho} + \alpha_{Fj}^{\rho-1} P_{Fj}^{1-\rho} + \alpha_{Lj}^{\rho-1} w_1^{1-\rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}, \tag{22}$$

where $\alpha_{Dj}$ captures the saliency of intermediate goods for firm $j$ and $P$ is the standard CES price index defined above. We note that this production function differs in two dimensions from the baseline model. First, all firms are using every other firms’ inputs through the composite good. Second, the composite good is aggregated with the elasticity of substitution in final demand, $\sigma$, even when these goods are used in production.

### Sectoral roundabout production economy

The important works by Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Blaum et al. (2016) extend the roundabout approach to incorporate sectoral linkages. We follow their approach by assuming that the composite intermediate good is sector-specific and a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of sectoral composite input bundles. To be specific, we consider the following production function for firm $j$ in sector $u$:

$$c_j = \phi_j^{-1} \left( \alpha_{Dj}^{\rho-1} \left( \prod_v P_v^{\gamma_{vu}(j)} \right)^{1-\rho} + \alpha_{Fj}^{\rho-1} P_{Fj}^{1-\rho} + \alpha_{Lj}^{\rho-1} w_1^{1-\rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}, \tag{23}$$

where $P_v = \left( \sum_{i \in v} \beta_{iD}^{\sigma-1} P_i^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}$ denotes the sector-$v$-specific CES price index for the composite sector $v$ good, and $\gamma_{vu}$ is the Cobb-Douglas share of sector $v$ inputs in the production of sector $u$ goods. For the sectoral model, we assume a sectoral Cobb-Douglas layer in the utility function which implies a price index for consumption $P = \prod_v P_v^{\gamma_{vH}}$.

### 3.3 Quantitative results

In this section, we provide a quantitative analysis of how international trade affects firms’ production costs and the consumer price index. We consider a counterfactual change in the import price of foreign goods. The analysis utilizes data from year 2012 on firm-to-firm transactions, firm-level output, international trade flows, and labor input, in combination with estimates or assumptions for the elasticity of substitution in the production function, $\rho$, and the utility function, $\sigma$. Throughout the paper, the baseline specification assumes $\sigma$ is equal to 4 and $\rho$ is equal to 2.\footnote{Using data for the US, Antras et al. (2017) estimate $\sigma = 3.85$ and Oberfield and Raval (2014) estimate a level of $\sigma$ between 3 and 5 among various manufacturing industries. In Appendix D.8, we perform sensitivity} For small changes and first-order approximations, these
elasticities will matter only in so far as they affect the calculation of the domestic wage change to ensure trade balance.

As we solve in the counterfactual exercise for the change in endogenous wages, we require the model equations and the data to be consistent with each other. Under the assumptions made so far, the model is too stylized to rationalize all observed ratios of sales to input costs (mark-ups). Therefore, throughout this section we assume that the firm charges a fixed mark-up, $\mu_i$ on all its sales that is calculated from the data as the ratio of sales over input costs. This assumption does not affect the results in Propositions 1 and 2 except for the calculation of the endogenous wage change.

The results in this section are focused on the change in firm-level costs and the change in the real wage due to a 10% foreign price increase. We also analyze the change in real wage and real income when going to autarky. We emphasize that when we compare the predictions from the baseline model with those from the alternative models outlined in Section 3.2, we keep unchanged the firm-level variables on domestic sales (aggregated over households and to other firms), imports and exports, domestic inputs, and labor costs. Therefore, we also hold the aggregates of these variables constant when comparing across models.

We start by analyzing the effects of a 10% increase in the foreign input prices on firm-level costs. As foreign inputs are heavily used in Belgium exports and, by assumption, the export demand is relatively elastic compared to import demand, the domestic nominal wage falls by 2% to ensure trade balance. Figure 3a displays the effects on firms’ production costs, as measured by equation (11) of Proposition 1. The horizontal axis represents the change in firm-level costs, which are bounded between .98 (the change in the nominal wage) and 1.1 (the change in the foreign price). The histograms of cost changes show that most firms would be significantly affected by the change in the foreign input prices. This is as expected since most firms are heavily dependent on foreign inputs (see Figure 1a). Even though the price of domestic labor falls by approximately 2%, the majority of firms would have 2.7% or larger nominal cost increases. Figures 3b and 3c displays the histograms of the change in firm-level costs as measured by the roundabout models. Both in the simple and the sectoral roundabout economy (with 52 different sectors), the change in the firm-level cost is considerably more compressed than when using the baseline model. This is because these models fail to capture the large amount of heterogeneity in firms’ exposure to foreign inputs that is observed in the data. At the 90th percentile, for example, the change in the firm-level cost...

\[\text{Note that for some firms this ratio is less than one.}\]

\[\text{We aggregate the firm-to-firm transactions to 52 sectors to calculate the sectoral input-output coefficients. We do this aggregation based on the firm-to-firm transaction data to keep the aggregates unchanged across the various models that we are comparing. This would not be possible when using published sectoral input-output tables, which are not consistent with aggregated firm-to-firm transaction data; in particular, these published tables lead to much smaller coefficients for the wholesale and retail sector.}\]
cost is 25 percent larger in the baseline model as compared to the roundabout models.

Figure 3: Histograms of firm-level cost changes

Notes: Note that all three histograms are bounded from above with 1.1, which is the change in the foreign price. The changes in the nominal wages are different across the three models, which generates different lower bounds. See Online Appendix D.4 for analogous figures plotting firm-level cost changes relative to the change in nominal wage, \( \hat{c}_i \), in which all three histograms are bounded from below with 1 but have different upper bounds.

To investigate the effect of the increase in the foreign input prices on the real wage, we use equation (19) in Proposition 2. Applied to our data, this equation suggests that a 10% foreign price increase leads to a 6% decline in the real wage. This sizable fall in real wages reflects the combination of a large import content in domestic final demand (\( \sum_j s_j H^{Total} F_j \) equals 0.584) and a 2% decline in the nominal wage. The fall in real income is even larger as firms and their owners lose profits from exports (see Online Appendix D.7). While our results are based on the assumption of fixed mark-ups implying a perfect pass-through of cost shocks to other firms, Kikkawa et al. (2018) analyze the effects of an import price shock under variable mark-ups in firm-to-firm trade. They find that the aggregate welfare change is similar when allowing for variable mark-ups compared to fixed mark-ups.

In Table 2, we decompose the change in the real wage into the effect from the direct cost increase and the indirect increase through intermediate goods. We consider both the case of a 10% foreign price increase and the extreme case of autarky. In the price index calculation, all firms are weighted by their sales to households. We find that about half of the increase in the price index is due to the direct effect, where the other half is coming from the indirect effect. In Online Appendix D.6, we furthermore calculate how final good prices (weighted by household expenditure on these goods) change across broad sectors in the economy. We find that the increase in the price index is coming primarily from firms that have their main activity in manufacturing, wholesale or retail.

How do these results compare to the back-of-the-envelope calculations motivated by Hulten (1978)? Using equation (21) and assuming perfect competition, no import content in the production of exports, and no change in the nominal wage, one can approximate the
Table 2: Changes in real wage, decomposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Indirect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% increase in $p_F$</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autarky</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td>0.795</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The number for Direct is computed by replacing $s_{Fj}^{Total}$ in equation (19) with the direct foreign input share, $s_{Fj}$. The number for Indirect is computed by replacing $s_{Fj}^{Total}$ in equation (19) with the indirect foreign input share, $s_{Fj}^{Total} - s_{Fj}$. The nominal wage change $\hat{w}$ is the same across the three columns and computed according to Online Appendix A.3. Due to non-linearities, the direct effects and the indirect effects do not necessarily add up. In Appendix D.3, we report an analogous decomposition under a first-order approximation where the decomposition is additive, leading to quantitatively similar results.

Table 3a shows that the differences between the aggregate predictions of the two alternative models and that of the baseline model are noticeably larger when one considers a large foreign price change ($\hat{p}_F \rightarrow \infty$) so that the economy is going to autarky. The real wage falls by 44% in the baseline model and by 40% in the simple roundabout model. The differences between models for large changes in foreign prices is driven by two opposing forces: On the one hand, firms are much more homogeneously affected by trade under the roundabout economy assumption, so it is more difficult for the consumer to substitute away from the firms with the largest price increases. All else equal, this effect leads to a larger fall in the real wage in the roundabout economy. On the other hand, in the roundabout economy the intermediate good is aggregated using the same elasticity as in final demand, $\sigma$, hence allowing firms to substitute more than in the baseline model, which in turn leads to a
smaller fall in real wages. The real wage would fall the most under the sectoral roundabout economy assumption as the utility function was changed to Cobb-Douglas across sectors. In Online Appendix D.7, we discuss the analogous results for the changes in real income. The ordering in the real income changes is the same as the ordering in the real wage changes when going to autarky across the three models.

Table 3: Changes in real wage

(a) Changes in real wage upon 10% increase in foreign price

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Simple Roundabout</th>
<th>Sectoral Roundabout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{\hat{w}}{\hat{P}} \left</td>
<td>p_F = 1.1 \right.$</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Changes in real wage upon autarky

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Simple Roundabout</th>
<th>Sectoral Roundabout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{\hat{w}}{\hat{P}} \left</td>
<td>p_F \to \infty \right.$</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our analysis so far has taken the network structure of firms as fixed. In the following section, we analyze how the network forms endogenously.

4 Model with endogenous production networks

This section develops a model of trade with endogenous network formation, allowing buyer-supplier relationships to change in response to trade shocks. The model builds on the theoretical framework presented in Section 3.1. We assume the same preferences, demand functions, production technology, and market structure as in the model with fixed production networks. What is new is that firms now optimally choose their set of suppliers (i.e. the firm’s sourcing strategy) and decide whether to import and export. We first describe the model with endogenous network formation and discuss how it can be solved. Then we estimate the model and use it to quantify how international trade affects firms’ production costs and consumer prices with and without endogenous network formation.

4.1 Model

4.1.1 Sourcing strategies and extensive margins of trade

We assume that only buyers initiate linkages with other domestic firms. Forming linkages to suppliers is costly, and firm $j$ incurs a random, firm-pair-specific fixed cost $f_{kj}w$ to add

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29This force disappears when one assumes $\sigma = \rho$. Table 7c in Appendix D.8 shows that the real wage decline is larger in the simple roundabout economy than in the baseline model when we assume $\sigma = \rho = 2$. 

---
The realization of fixed costs is known to the firm at the time it selects suppliers. Firms in our model make profits due to positive mark-ups in sales to domestic and foreign final consumers. Since the buyer is assumed to have all the bargaining power, firms do not make profits from sales to other firms. Hence, variable profits are proportional to firm-level sales to final consumers.

Given a sourcing strategy, $Z_j$, and export participation choice, $I_{jF}$, the profits of firm $j$ are equal to variable profits less the fixed costs of domestic and foreign sourcing, $\sum_{k \in Z_j} f_{kj} w$, and the fixed costs of exporting, $I_{jF} f_{jF} w$:

$$\pi_j(Z_j, I_{jF}) = \pi_j^{\text{var}}(Z_j, I_{jF}) - \sum_{k \in Z_j} f_{kj} w - I_{jF} f_{jF} w.$$  \hspace{1cm} (24)

We assume that firm $j$ exogenously meets a set of eligible suppliers, $Z_j$. Firm $j$ then endogenously decides on the set of suppliers and whether or not to export:

$$\max_{Z_j, I_{jF}} \pi_j(Z_j, I_{jF}) \hspace{0.5cm} \text{s.t.} \hspace{0.5cm} Z_j \subseteq Z_j, I_{jF} \in \{0, 1\}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (25)

When deciding on whether to add a supplier to its sourcing strategy, the firm is trading off a reduction in its variable cost (leading to higher variable profits) for an increase in its fixed cost. Solving this problem is difficult for two reasons. First, each firm faces a large discrete choice problem of selecting $Z_j$ and $I_{jF}$. Second, the profit function, $\pi_j^{\text{var}}(Z_j, I_{jF})$, depends on the cost of other firms in the economy, which in turn are equilibrium objects. We now describe how we tackle these two challenges.

We overcome the first challenge by combining theoretical insights on complementarities in the firms’ decision making with an iterative algorithm developed by Jia (2008)\footnote{Antras et al. (2017) adopted this approach to solve a multi-country model of global sourcing. In recent work, Arkolakis and Eckert (2017) have extended this approach to the case where suppliers are substitutes in the firm’s profit function.}. Given our assumption that final demand is more elastic than the substitution between inputs in the production function, $\sigma > \rho$, the marginal benefit of adding a supplier is increasing in the set of existing suppliers, and it is higher if the firm exports. These complementarities become useful when applying the iterative algorithm to solve the problem described in (25) for a given firm given its knowledge about the costs of the eligible suppliers in $Z_j$. The algorithm works as follows. Holding the export participation choice fixed, one obtains a lower bound for the optimal sourcing strategy by evaluating the profitability of adding each supplier given a starting guess of no suppliers. The suppliers for which the marginal benefit of inclusion in the sourcing strategy is positive are then included in the updated guess of the sourcing strategy. Then again one evaluates the marginal benefit of each supplier and adds those with positive marginal benefit to the updated guess. Due to complementarities, the marginal benefit of a
supplier is more likely to be positive as the set of suppliers in the current guess increases. Once this iterative procedure stalls, one has obtained a lower bound for the optimal sourcing choice given the exporting choice. Similarly, one obtains an upper bound by including all eligible suppliers in the initial guess and dropping those suppliers with negative marginal benefit from the updated guess of suppliers. The optimal sourcing set, for a given export participation choice, then must be in between the two bounds. Eventually, one also repeats the procedure for the alternative export participation choice, and finally selects the sourcing strategy and exporting choice that yields the maximum profits. In Online Appendix F, we describe the algorithm more formally and in detail.\footnote{The procedure is very similar to the one described in Antras et al. (2017). Here, we also develop a greedy algorithm in case that the differences in the lower and upper bounds for the optimal solution are too wide to evaluate the profits of all feasible combinations in between. As in Antras et al. (2017), we find that in about 99% of the cases the lower and upper bounds are perfectly overlapping (see Table 9 in the Online Appendix F).}

To overcome the second challenge, it is necessary to deal with the fixed point problem that arises because firms’ sourcing strategies are interdependent. Not only would it be extremely challenging computationally to find a fixed point in the set of costs for all firms so that these costs are consistent with everyone’s optimal sourcing decision, the uniqueness of such a fixed point is also unlikely. On the one hand, if firms guess that suppliers have very high unit costs, this could result in the formation of very few linkages and lead to high unit costs overall. On the other hand, if firms guess that suppliers have very low unit costs, this could result in the formation of many linkages and lead to low unit costs overall. To get around these problems, we consider the formation of an acyclic network, postulating an ordering of firms and restricting the eligible set of suppliers to firms that appear prior to the buyer.

To be concrete, all firms can choose to import foreign inputs and to export their output abroad. However, the set of eligible domestic suppliers varies across firms. Specifically, we order firms in a sequence \( S = \{1, 2, 3, \ldots, N\} \) that restricts the set of eligible suppliers, \( Z_j \), as illustrated in Figure 4. Because we assumed buyers have the full bargaining power in any firm-to-firm transactions, firms only need to know the choices of the firms prior in the sequence. Taken together, these assumptions make the network formation tractable, as we describe below.

Firm 1 is first in the sequence and can only hire labor inputs. To make its decision of how much labor to hire, firm 1 only needs to know the wage level, \( w \), and domestic market demand, \( \frac{E}{p \cdot 1 - \sigma} \). Firm 2 is second in the sequence and can hire both labor inputs as well as purchase the input produced by firm 1. To make these decisions, firm 2 needs to know the wage and market demand level as well as the cost of its eligible supplier (firm 1). Firm 3 can hire labor and purchase the inputs from firm 1, firm 2, or both. And so on. Given a guess for equilibrium wages, \( w \), and domestic market demand, \( \frac{E}{p \cdot 1 - \sigma} \), one can solve the problems of
the firms sequentially.

Figure 4: Endogenous network formation — eligible connections

Although the above ordering of firms simplifies the problem, we are still limited in the number of possible sourcing strategies we can feasibly evaluate. We therefore restrict the set of eligible suppliers for firm $j$, $Z_j$, to be a random subset from the set of firms prior to firm $j$ in the sequence. The suppliers for firm $j$ are then optimally chosen as the solution to the problem in (25). In practice, we choose the maximum cardinality of $Z_j$ to be 300. We have experimented with the threshold and found that our model fit and counterfactual predictions are very similar when, alternatively, imposing a maximum of 200 or 250 eligible suppliers. The firm’s order in the sequence of supplier choices and its set of eligible suppliers are becoming attributes of the firm and therefore primitives of the model.

Imposing a tie-breaking rule that in the case of indifference a supplier is included ensures a unique solution to the problem in (25). As a consequence, the network formation will also be unique given a set of wages and a guess for the price index. We can then alter wages, price index, and expenditure to achieve labor market clearing, trade balance, and a fixed point for the price index and expenditure. Importantly, we are searching here only for a fixed point in wages and price index (only 2 scalars,) as opposed to searching for a large fixed point vector in every firm’s costs and searching strategies. In other words, the ordering approach implies that even with a rich micro structure and firm-level heterogeneity, knowing only two equilibrium variables is sufficient to solve sequentially the firms’ problems. We discuss the aggregation and the equilibrium with endogenous network structure more formally below.
4.1.2 Aggregation and equilibrium

The model aggregation and equilibrium are broadly similar to the case with fixed networks. However, there are a few notable differences. The first is that firms incur fixed costs — paid in units of labor — to add a domestic buyer, import, or export. Therefore, the labor market clearing condition becomes:

$$wL = \sum_j \frac{\mu_j - 1}{\mu_j} s_{Lj} x_j + w \sum_j \left( \sum_{k \in Z_j} f_{kj} + I_{jF} f_{jF} \right).$$

(26)

Additionally, a firm’s profit function now subtracts the incurred fixed costs, and a firm’s sourcing strategy and export participation are now endogenous choices. However, the trade balance condition remains unchanged. The following definition formally describes equilibrium with an endogenous network structure.

Definition 2 (Equilibrium with endogenous network structure)

Given foreign expenditure, $E_F$, foreign price index, $P_F$, and a set of prices by foreign suppliers, $\{p_{Fj}\}_j$, as well as set of eligible suppliers, $Z_j$, that satisfies acyclicity of the network, an equilibrium for the model with endogenous network structure and endogenous export participation is a wage level, $w$, price index for the consumer, $P$, and aggregate expenditure, $E$, as well as a set of sourcing strategies and export participation choices, such that the firm’s optimization problem in (25), and equations (5), (7), (8), (9), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (26) hold.

We note that the equilibrium of the economy may not be necessarily efficient. A source for a potential inefficiency is that the firm, when deciding on its sourcing strategy, is not internalizing the full benefits its lowered variable cost have for its buyers. We will return to discussing the efficiency of the economy later in the counterfactual analysis.

4.2 Assessing the assumptions about the shape of the network

Given the assumptions we invoked to solve the endogenous network formation, the resulting network will be acyclic. As shown in Figure 5, in an acyclic firm network, there exists at least one way to sort firms so that all directed edges face one direction. In contrast, in a cyclic network at least one edge will face the opposite direction. This feature of our network formation mechanism is admittedly restrictive. We now perform two checks to assess how well the Belgian data can be approximated by an acyclic network.
4.2.1 How cyclic is the production network?

Let $\nu(i)$ be an ordering of firms that maps firms \{i, j, k, \ldots\} $\in \Theta$ into numbers from \{1, \ldots N\}. To describe how cyclic the Belgian production network is, we want to find the optimal $\nu(k)$ that minimizes the following objective function:

$$\min_{\nu(k)} \sum_{i,j} 1 \{i \in Z_j\} 1 \{\nu(i) > \nu(j)\},$$

where $Z_j$ is the supplier set of firm $j$. Solving this problem corresponds to minimizing the number of directed edges that are facing the direction opposite to that of the sorting order. In other words, we try to find an ordering that minimizes the number of arrows facing to the left in the cyclic network in Figure 5.

To solve this problem, which is also known as the feedback arc set problem, we adopt an algorithm proposed by Eades, Lin, and Smyth (1993). The details of the computational algorithm and implementation are presented in Online Appendix E. Intuitively, the algorithm places firms with a high net outdegree (number of outgoing links minus number of incoming links) at the beginning of the ordering and those firms with a low net outdegree towards the end of the ordering. The algorithm offers a local minimum, showing that at most 18% of edges in the whole firm-to-firm network in 2012 violate acyclicity.\footnote{While there is no perfect reference point for this figure, we can compare it to the structure of the directed social network Twitter. Simpson, Srinivasan, and Thomo (2016) calculate that 23% of edges are in violation of acyclicity in the Twitter network in the year 2010.}

We also search for an ordering that minimizes the value of firm-to-firm sales in violation of acyclicity.\footnote{Specifically, we solve the following problem: $\min_{\nu(k)} \sum_{i,j} x_{ij} 1 \{\nu(i) > \nu(j)\}$, where $x_{ij}$ is the value of firm-to-firm sales in violation of acyclicity.}
find that no more than 23% of firm-to-firm sales are in violation of acyclicity. We will refer to the former as the unweighted ordering algorithm and the latter as the weighted ordering algorithm. Note that under both approaches, this heuristic algorithm does not guarantee a global minimum solution. Likely there exists another ordering where the approximation of an acyclic network is even better than the one we find.34

A natural question that arises is how different the structure of an economy with an acyclic network is in comparison to the economy observed in the data. One way to make this comparison is to calculate input-output tables with and without the firms in buyer-supplier relationships that violate acyclicity. We find that when calculating input-output tables with 72 sectors, the correlations between the input-output table coefficients from the full data and the data without links in violation of the ordering are high.35 When we use the unweighted ordering algorithm output, the correlation is 0.90, and it is even higher, 0.97, when using the weighted ordering algorithm output.

4.2.2 Gains from trade under fixed networks: cyclic versus acyclic production networks

Another way to assess the assumption of an acyclic network is to examine how the results based on the exogenous network model change if we exclude transactions that violate acyclicity. It is reassuring to find that estimated effect of international trade on consumer prices and firms’ costs of production are very similar if we only use firm-to-firm sales that are consistent with the acyclic network obtained by the ordering algorithm described in Section

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34Coleman and Wirth (2009) and Simpson et al. (2016) find that compared to other algorithms proposed in the computer science literature, the algorithm of Eades et al. (1993) does well in terms of speed and finding a low objective.  
35To construct the input-output table coefficients, we aggregate firm-to-firm transactions within the supplying and buying sector. We note that this procedure differs from the national account definition of an input-output table. First, the rows and columns of our aggregated tables are referring to the main sectors of the buyers and suppliers, but these firms can also have a significant share of their production in other sectors. Second, in national account tables, the contribution of the wholesale and retail sectors to the production of the other goods only refer to the trade margin of retailers and wholesalers. In our data, the wholesale and retail sectors are accounted based on their total sales and total input consumption and not on their trade margin.  
36These correlations remain high when we drop the diagonal coefficients. With the unweighted ordering algorithm output, the correlation is 0.89, and with the weighted ordering algorithm output, the correlation stays at 0.97. We also find that these high correlations are robust when doing the same exercise at the 4-digit level with 524 industries. The correlation is 0.89 when using the unweighted ordering algorithm output and 0.93 when using the weighted ordering algorithm output. Finally, this heuristic algorithm produces orderings that are highly correlated with upstreamness measures in the existing literature, such as that from Antrás, Chior, Fally, and Hillberry (2012). The rank correlation between the upstreamness measure from Antrás et al. (2012) and the ordering from the unweighted algorithm’s is -0.53, and the rank correlation between the ordering from the weighted algorithm is -0.76. However, this upstream measure produces much larger objectives, with 36% of links and 31% of firm-to-firm sales in violation of acyclicity.
4.2.1 Specifically, we keep the direct import share of each firm the same as in the data, set all transactions in violation of the ordering to zero, and adjust all other domestic firm-to-firm input shares such that share of each firm j’s input purchases, $\sum_{i \in Z_j} s_{ij}$, is unchanged. The results presented in Table 8 in Online Appendix D.8 show that the gains from trade under an exogenous network are virtually identical if we only use the subset of transactions for which the domestic production network is acyclic.

4.3 Determining the model parameters

When allowing for endogenous network formation, we are not able to analytically solve the model. Instead, we use the data to determine the model parameters and then provide numerical results for several counterfactual analyses. The goal of these numerical analyses is to draw inference about how endogenous network formation may affect gains-from-trade calculation in an economy that matches our data in important ways.

In the estimation of our model, we simulate 100,000 Belgian firms, approximately the same size as our sample in 2012. A firm is characterized by a set of eligible suppliers that satisfies the ordering, a core productivity level, a vector of firm-pair-specific cost shifters, a foreign input cost shifter, a foreign demand shifter, a vector of fixed cost draws for all eligible suppliers, and fixed costs of importing and exporting. We normalize firms’ labor productivity shifters, $\alpha_{Lj} = 1$, and firms’ domestic final demand shifters, $\beta_{jH} = 1$. Firms are positioned in an order from 1 to 100,000. The sets of up to 300 eligible suppliers are drawn randomly such that the eligible suppliers are positioned earlier than the buyer in the order of firms.

As a first step of the estimation, we recover the productivity distribution of firms (scaled by some general equilibrium objects) from the identity

$$\frac{x_{iH}^{1/(\sigma-1)}}{s_{Li}^{1/(1-\rho)}} = \phi_i \frac{PE^{1/(\sigma-1)}}{\mu w}. \quad (27)$$

Observing all the terms on the left hand side enables us to estimate the distribution $\phi_i \frac{PE^{1/(\sigma-1)}}{\mu w}$. After visually inspecting the distribution, we assume it is log-normal and estimate the scale parameter to be $-1.52$ and the dispersion parameter to be 0.85.

We next turn to the parameterization for the distributions of cost and demand shifters. We choose a parameterization for the firm-pair-specific shifter in the production function, $\alpha_{Lj}$ as well as $\alpha_{kj}$ (\forall k \in Z_j) enter multiplicatively with the inverse of firm productivity, $1/\phi_j$ in the cost function in equation (7). We therefore normalize $\alpha_{Lj} = 1$. As we have only data on revenues and costs (not separated by price and quantity), we normalize the domestic final demand shifter, $\beta_{jH} = 1$.

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37 The only exception is when there is no other domestic supplier of a firm, in which case in the data with only acyclic transactions the domestic firm-to-firm input share is set to zero.

38 Note that $\alpha_{Lj}$ as well as $\alpha_{kj}$ (\forall k \in Z_j) enter multiplicatively with the inverse of firm productivity, $1/\phi_j$ in the cost function in equation (7). We therefore normalize $\alpha_{Lj} = 1$. As we have only data on revenues and costs (not separated by price and quantity), we normalize the domestic final demand shifter, $\beta_{jH} = 1$. 

32
\( \alpha_{kj} \), such that it can generate a more skewed distribution of firms’ outdegrees than of firms’ indegrees. Specifically, we assume that the \( \alpha_{kj} \) draw is a product of a supplier-\( k \)-specific random variables and an i.i.d. firm-pair-specific random variable. Outside the steps of the estimation described below, we choose the supplier-\( k \)-specific random variable to be drawn from a Beta distribution with shape parameters 0.1 and 0.9. We assume that firm-pair-specific random variables contained in \( \alpha_{kj} \), as well as \( \alpha_{Fj} \), and \( \beta_{jF} \) are independent draws from three log-normal distributions which share a common dispersion parameter, \( \Phi_{\alpha,\beta}^{disp} \), and have different scale parameters, \( \Phi_{\alpha,k}^{scale} \), \( \Phi_{\alpha,F}^{scale} \), and \( \Phi_{\beta,F}^{scale} \), respectively.

Similarly, the fixed cost draws for domestic purchases from other firms, imports, and exports, are drawn independently from three log-normal distributions with scale parameters \( \Phi_{\text{dom}}^{scale} \), \( \Phi_{\text{imp}}^{scale} \), and \( \Phi_{\text{exp}}^{scale} \) and a common dispersion parameter, \( \Phi_{\text{disp}}^{f} \). Overall, there are 8 parameters to be estimated.

We use a method of simulated moments to estimate our parameters. We target three sets of moments to match. The first set of moments describes the domestic sourcing patterns of firms. For example, we target the model to match the quartile distribution of number of suppliers. Following the procedure used by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011), we include in the first vector of moments generated by the model, \( \hat{m}_1(\Phi) \), the fraction of firms falling into the bins of the first, second, third, and fourth quartile of the number of suppliers. We also target the distribution of customers, share of labor costs in firms’ costs, and the firm-to-firm input shares (conditional on observing trade between firms). Using the same procedure as above, we include the fraction of firms in the four quartile bins of the distribution (using as thresholds the quartiles observed in the data). This generates 16 elements in the vector \( \hat{m}_1(\Phi) \).

The second set of moments characterizes firm-level patterns of imports and exports. We include in \( \hat{m}_2(\Phi) \) the share of firms that import and export, respectively. We also include the fraction of firms falling into the bins of the first, second, third, and fourth quartile of firms’ direct share of foreign inputs (conditional on importing). Furthermore, we target the quartiles of the total share of foreign inputs shown in Figure 1a. Similarly, on the export side, we target the quartiles of the direct share of exports (conditional on exporting) as well the total share of exports (as shown in Figure 1b). There are 18 elements in the vector \( \hat{m}_2(\Phi) \).

As a third set of moments, we include important aggregate targets such as the ratio of aggregate exports to aggregate final demand and the import content of domestic final demand. There are 2 elements in the vector \( \hat{m}_3(\Phi) \).

We describe the difference between the moments in the data and in the simulated model by \( \hat{y}(\Phi) \):
\[ \hat{g}(\Phi) = m - \hat{m}(\Phi) = \begin{bmatrix} m_1 - \hat{m}_1(\Phi) \\ m_2 - \hat{m}_2(\Phi) \\ m_3 - \hat{m}_3(\Phi) \end{bmatrix}, \]

and the following moment condition is assumed to hold at the true parameter value \( \Phi_0 \):\[
E [\hat{g}(\Phi_0)] = 0. \tag{28}
\]

The method of simulated moments selects the model parameters that minimize the following objective function:

\[ \hat{\Phi} = \arg \min_{\Phi} [\hat{g}(\Phi)]^\top W [\hat{g}(\Phi)], \tag{29} \]

where \( W \) is a weighting matrix.\[39\]

### 4.3.1 Estimation results

Table 4 shows the values of the estimated parameters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference and production</th>
<th>Fixed costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Phi_{\alpha_{\text{dom}}} )</td>
<td>( \Phi_{\alpha_{\text{F}}} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scale</td>
<td>scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Phi_{J_{\text{dom}}} )</td>
<td>( \Phi_{J_{\text{imp}}} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Phi_{J_{\text{exp}}} )</td>
<td>( \Phi_{J_{\text{disp}}} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>-2.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We note that the scale of the estimated parameters is affected by the choice of normalizations for the foreign market size and the price of the foreign input. We therefore focus on the model fit given these parameter estimates. Table 5 shows the targeted moments generated by the estimated parameters, compared with the moments from the data. Note that instead of showing the moments directly (i.e., the fraction of firms falling into each quartile bin), we show the values of the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles in both the data and model. The estimated model fits well the targeted statistics of firm-to-firm transactions. In particular, the model succeeds in generating a more skewed distribution of the number of domestic buyers than of the domestic suppliers. This enables the model to match also the differences in the distribution of total foreign input shares and total export shares. Analogous to Figure 1, we plot the distributions of direct and total foreign input shares and export shares from the estimated model and show them in Online Appendix H.1. While we succeed in generating different distributions of firms’ exposure to imports and exports, both directly and indirectly, the model also matches well the magnitude of aggregate imports relative to domestic final demand. Finally, we also match quite well the import content in domestic final demand,\[39\] We weight the moments equally, hence the weighting matrix is the identity matrix.
\[ \sum_i s_i H s_{F_i}^{Total} \], which is a key statistic that determines the magnitude of the change in real wage in response to a change in the foreign price (see equation (20)).

Table 5: Model fit: targeted moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of dom. suppliers 25th percentile</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dom. suppliers 50th percentile</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dom. suppliers 75th percentile</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dom. buyers 25th percentile</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dom. buyers 50th percentile</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dom. buyers 75th percentile</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of labor costs 25th percentile</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of labor costs 50th percentile</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of labor costs 75th percentile</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm-to-firm input share 25th percentile</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm-to-firm input share 50th percentile</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm-to-firm input share 75th percentile</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of firms that import</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct foreign input share (among importers) 25th percentile</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct foreign input share (among importers) 50th percentile</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct foreign input share (among importers) 75th percentile</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total foreign input share 25th percentile</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total foreign input share 50th percentile</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total foreign input share 75th percentile</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of firms that export</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct export share (among exporters) 25th percentile</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct export share (among exporters) 50th percentile</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct export share (among exporters) 75th percentile</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total export share 25th percentile</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total export share 50th percentile</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
<td>0.0328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total export share 75th percentile</td>
<td>0.1005</td>
<td>0.2982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Percentiles are calculated based on all firms in the sample. Share of labor costs refers to the fraction of labor costs in costs (labor costs + domestic purchases + imports) and the percentiles are calculated based on all firms in the sample. Firm-to-firm share refers to the fraction of costs a firm spends on one particular supplier and the percentiles are calculated for all firm-to-firm transactions. The percentiles for share of exports in total firm sales are calculated for all firms with positive export sales. The percentiles for share of imports in firm inputs are calculated for all firms with positive import purchases.

We also examine how well the model fits moments that were not directly targeted in the estimation. Specifically, we have not targeted directly the association of size between
buyers and suppliers that trade with each other. Consistent with the data, the model predicts a weak negative correlation between the number of suppliers of the buying firms (indegree buyer) and the number of buyer firms of suppliers (outdegree supplier). Similarly, the correlation between sales of the buying and selling firm is close to zero both in the data and in the model. Analogous to Figure 2 in the model generates the pattern that the size premium increases sharply for low values of direct import and export shares and only gradually increase for higher direct shares. In comparison, the sales premium for total share measures increases more gradually (Figure 6 in Online Appendix H.2).

Table 6: Model fit: non-targeted moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corr (Indegree buyer, Outdegree supplier)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr (Sales buyer, Sales supplier)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 Effects of changes in the price of foreign goods with endogenous network formation

Equipped with the parameter estimates of our model, we next turn to the same counterfactual experiment as we studied under fixed linkages, i.e., a 10% increase in the price of the imported goods. As before, we solve for the change in the domestic wage such that trade is balanced and the labor market clears. Here, however, we allow firms to also change their set of suppliers (i.e. the firm’s sourcing strategy) or alter the decision to import and export in response to the trade shock.

Figure 6 presents the density of the change in firms costs in the model with endogenous network formation. Similar to what we found in the model with a fixed network structure, the unit cost of a large majority of firms increase. Some firms, however, benefit from the rise in the domestic price index, which increases their overall scale and enables them to add more suppliers and obtain lower unit cost. Overall, we find that under endogenous networks the number of domestic linkages would increase by 1% in response to a 10% increase in the price of foreign goods. Underlying this net increase, however, is churn in the domestic linkages between firms in the economy.

To better understand which kind of firms have the highest unit cost increases and which kind of firms can actually reduce their unit cost, we examine ex-ante firm outcomes and the counterfactual response in unit cost, number of suppliers, etc. Figure 7 depicts the univariate correlations between firms’ cost changes and observable firm-level variables prior to the change. Recall that under fixed networks, the total share of foreign inputs are the key firm-level predictor for firms’ cost increases in response to a change in the import price. Even
under endogenous networks, the total share of foreign inputs is still a strong indicator of how much firms’ costs will change in response to a change in the price of the imported good. The cost change is also negatively correlated with firms’ share of labor costs in variable costs, and positively correlated with firms’ size variables such as log total sales and log sales to domestic final demand. We also find that firms that have a high total foreign input share, high export share, or a low labor share are more likely to reduce their number of suppliers in response to a 10% increase in the price of imported goods (see Table 10 in Online Appendix H.3 for supporting regression results). Due to complementarity in the exporting, importing, and domestic sourcing decisions, it is intuitive that the firms that lose the most from the price increase in the foreign goods may also be the ones that reduce the most the number of domestic suppliers. Those firms that have a low total foreign input share or a high labor share are more likely to see a reduction in their unit cost when the foreign input price increases (see Table 10 in Online Appendix H.3 and Figure 7).

Figure 6: Cost changes under endogenous networks

Notes: The figure shows the density of cost changes from a 10% increase in the price of foreign goods under endogenous networks.

To analyze the quantitative importance of endogenous networks, we also compute the analogous cost changes under fixed networks. To compute the cost changes under fixed networks, we start from the economy generated by our endogenous network model and consider the same change in the foreign price while holding fixed the choice of suppliers as well as the decisions to import and export. Hence as in Section 3 when conducting model
comparisons we compare between models that have identical fit of firm-level and aggregate outcomes of sales, intermediates, imports, and exports prior to the counterfactual change.

We next turn to the changes in the real wage that are summarized in Table 7. For a 10% increase in the foreign price, we find that the real wage declines in the endogenous network model by 6.18 percent while the real wage declines by 6.79 in the fixed network economy. Hence, the re-formation of buyer-seller linkages dampens the aggregate impact of a negative shock. For large changes in the price of the foreign goods, it becomes more even more costly for the economy to be tied to the fixed network structure and the dampening effect gets stronger. The real wage would fall by 7 percentage points less under endogenous than under fixed network structure when going to autarky. In relative terms, the real wage decline is about 10 percent weaker due to the endogeneity of the production network.

We also consider a 10% or 50% decline in the foreign price. It is easy to show that for an efficient economy, the flexibility of the network structure must dampen the aggregate effect of a negative shock (i.e., increase of the foreign price) and amplify the benefits of a positive shock (i.e., a decrease in the foreign price). However, as discussed above, the endogenous network economy is not necessarily efficient. In particular, firms do not fully internalize the benefits their cost reductions bring to their buyers, their buyers’ buyers, etc.
Therefore, whether endogenous networks amplify/dampen the effects of economic shocks is ultimately an empirical question. For a 10% decrease in the price of foreign goods, we find that allowing for endogenous network formation generates a smaller increase in the real wage. By comparison, when considering a 50% decrease in the price of foreign goods, we find that the endogeneity of the network amplifies the benefits of this positive shock, and yields a 25 percentage points real wage gain over and above the fixed network benchmark. We have tried various alternative parameterizations of our endogenous networks model and robustly obtained the result that the endogenous network structure dampens the effect of a large negative shock (i.e., autarky) and amplifies the benefits of a large positive shock (i.e., 50% reduction in the foreign price).

### Table 7: Changes in real wage upon change in foreign price

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Endogenous Network</th>
<th>Fixed Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% increase ($\hat{p}_F = 1.1$)</td>
<td>0.9388</td>
<td>0.9321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autarky ($\hat{p}_F \to \infty$)</td>
<td>0.4844</td>
<td>0.4157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% decrease ($\hat{p}_F = 0.9$)</td>
<td>1.0681</td>
<td>1.0881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% decrease ($\hat{p}_F = 0.5$)</td>
<td>2.2779</td>
<td>2.0170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5 Conclusion

In this paper we have used novel data on the domestic transactions between firms together with information about firm-level exports and imports to illustrate that many firms are strongly indirectly linked to international trade even though they may not be direct importers or exporters themselves. We have shown that the total share of foreign inputs can be used as a sufficient statistic together with the elasticity of substitution in the production function to calculate firm-level unit cost increases from banning international trade. We have also developed a novel framework for analyzing the endogenous formation of the production network. Our conceptual insight is that it is much more tractable to model the formation of an acyclic than a cyclic production network. Reassuringly, our analysis suggests that an acyclic production network is a reasonable approximation to the full network, in the sense that the amount of transactions to be dropped to yield an acyclic network is not too large, the input-output table coefficients are similar to the full data, and the gains from trade under fixed networks are nearly the same as when using the full data. We hope that our model of network formation can prove useful in other contexts in macroeconomics or industrial organization beyond the analysis of international trade.
References


A Theoretical Results

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Proof.

We have

\[ s_{Total}^F_j = s_F^j + \sum_i s_{ij}^s s_{Total}^F_i \]

and

\[ c_j^{1-\rho} = \sum_k \alpha_{kj}^{\rho-1} \phi_j^{\rho-1} c_k^{1-\rho} + \alpha_{Lj}^{\rho-1} \phi_j^{\rho-1} w^{1-\rho} + \alpha_{Fj}^{\rho-1} \phi_j^{\rho-1} p_F^{1-\rho}, \]

where \( p_{Fj} \) is common across \( j \).

Consider a uniform foreign price change, where firm \( j \)'s import price changes to \( \hat{p}_F \). Then firm \( j \)'s new cost function is

\[ \hat{c}_j^{1-\rho} = \sum_k \alpha_{kj}^{\rho-1} \phi_j^{\rho-1} c_k^{1-\rho} + \alpha_{Lj}^{\rho-1} \phi_j^{\rho-1} \hat{w}^{1-\rho} + \alpha_{Fj}^{\rho-1} \phi_j^{\rho-1} \hat{p}_F^{1-\rho}. \]

Computing the change in the costs yields:

\[ \frac{dc_j}{c_j} \bigg| \hat{p}_F = \left( 1 - s_{Total}^F_j \hat{w}^{1-\rho} + s_{Total}^F \hat{p}_F \right) \frac{dw}{w} + s_{Total}^F \frac{dp_F}{p_F}. \]

For small changes, log-linearize equation (11) around \( \hat{p}_F = \hat{c}_j = \hat{w} = 1 \) and obtain

\[ \frac{dc_j}{c_j} = \left( 1 - s_{Total}^F \hat{c}_j \right) \frac{dw}{w} + s_{Total}^F \frac{dp_F}{p_F}. \]
This result can be obtained in a more general setting. Consider a constant returns to scale production function. Denote firm $j$’s cost function to produce $y$ units of output with $c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)$. Taking the total derivatives of the cost function yields:

$$dc(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y) = \sum_{k \in Z_j} \frac{\partial c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)}{\partial p_{kj}} dp_{kj} + \frac{\partial c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)}{\partial w} dw + \frac{\partial c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)}{\partial y} dy$$

Dividing both sides with $c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)$, we get:

$$\frac{dc(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)}{c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)} - \frac{y}{c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)} \frac{\partial c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)}{\partial y} dy = \sum_{k \in Z_j} \frac{dp_{kj}}{c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)} + \frac{w}{c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)} \frac{\partial c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)}{\partial w} dw.$$

By Shephard’s lemma, we also have $\frac{\partial c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)}{\partial p_{kj}} = x_{kj}(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)$ and $\frac{\partial c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)}{\partial w} = \ell_j(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y)$. In addition, from the constant returns to scale assumption, $c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, y) = yc(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, 1)$. Rearrange and obtain:

$$\frac{dc(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, 1)}{c(\{p_{kj}\}_{k \in Z_j}, w, 1)} = \sum_{k \in Z_j} s_{kj} \frac{dp_{kj}}{p_{kj}} + s_{Lj} \frac{dw}{w}, \forall y.$$

That is, if the production function is CRS, the percentage change in the unit cost equals a weighted average of percentage change in factor prices, with a factor’s weight equal to the expenditure share on the factor. We can then iterate forward to arrive at equation (12).

\[\blacksquare\]

### A.2 Proof of Proposition 2

**Proof.**

From equation (5), we have the expression for the price index after the shock,

$$\tilde{P} = \left( \sum_i \beta_i^{1-\sigma} \mu_i \hat{c}_i^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}.$$
Combining this expression with the pre-shock price index $P$, we have

$$
\hat{P} | \hat{p}_F = \frac{\hat{P}}{P} = \left( \sum_i \beta_i \sigma \left( P \right)^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}
$$

$$
= \left( \sum_i \frac{\hat{c}_i \left( \hat{\rho}_F \right)^{1-\sigma}}{\hat{\rho}_F} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}
$$

where $s_{iH}$ denotes firm $i$’s share in final consumption. Combine with equation (11) and obtain

$$
\frac{\hat{w}}{\hat{\rho}_F} = \hat{w} \left( \sum_i \frac{s_{iH} \left( \hat{c}_i \right)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \right)
$$

$$
= \left( \sum_i \frac{s_{iH} \left( \frac{1 - s_{iH}}{\hat{w}^{1-\rho}} \right)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}
$$

For small changes, first obtain the log-linearized change in the aggregate price index,

$$
\frac{dP}{P} = \sum_j s_{jH} \frac{dc_j}{c_j}
$$

Combine with equation (12) and obtain

$$
\frac{dw}{w} \frac{dP}{P} = \left( \frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \right) \sum_j s_{jH} s_{jH} \frac{d\psi}{\psi}
$$

Again, as in Proposition 1, the result for small changes holds more generally. Now consider a constant returns to scale utility function and describe it as $e(\{p_{jH}\}, U) = Ue(\{p_{jH}\}, 1)$. That is, the minimized expenditure to achieve utility level $U$ equals $U$ times the minimized expenditure to obtain an unit utility. Furthermore, with homothetic preferences, the ideal price index $P$ is the minimized cost of buying one unit of utility, i.e., $P = e(\{p_{jH}\}, 1)$.

Take the total derivative of $e(\{p_{jH}\}, U)$ and obtain:

$$
\frac{de(\{p_{jH}\}, U)}{e(\{p_{jH}\}, U)} = \sum_j \frac{P_{jH}}{e(\{p_{jH}\}, U)} \frac{dp_{jH}}{p_{jH}} + U \frac{\partial e(\{p_{jH}\}, U)}{\partial U} \frac{dU}{U}
$$
Then total differentiate $Ue(\{p_{jH}\}, 1)$:

$$\frac{de(\{p_{jH}\}, U)}{e(\{p_{jH}\}, U)} = \frac{dP}{P} + \frac{dU}{U}.$$ 

By Shephard’s Lemma, $\frac{\partial e(\{p_{jH}\}, U)}{\partial p_{jH}} = x_{jH}(\{p_{jH}\}, U)$. Equating the previous two equations and dropping $\frac{dU}{U}$, the percentage change in the ideal price index for any level $U$ is:

$$\frac{dP}{P} = \sum_j s_{jH} \frac{dp_{jH}}{p_{jH}}.$$ 

The percentage change in the real wage is thus:

$$\frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dP}{P} = \frac{dw}{w} - \sum_j s_{jH} \frac{dp_{jH}}{p_{jH}}.$$ 

As $\frac{dp_{jH}}{p_{jH}} = \frac{de_j}{c_j}$, the rest of Proposition 2 follows.

\[\blacksquare\]

### A.3 Derivation of equation (21)

Here we show that under perfect competition, the change in the real wage in equation (20) can be expressed as the product of $\frac{\text{Imports}}{VA}$ and the change in terms of trade.

The change in the terms of trade can be written as the change in the average export price minus the change in the import price, $\sum_j s_{jF} \frac{dc_j}{c_j} - \frac{dp_{F}}{p_{F}}$, where $s_{jF}$ is firm $j$’s share in aggregate exports. Combining with equation (12), we have

$$\frac{\text{Imports}}{VA} \left( \sum_j s_{jF} \frac{dc_j}{c_j} - \frac{dp_{F}}{p_{F}} \right) = \frac{\text{Imports}}{VA} \left( \sum_j s_{jF} \left( (1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}) \frac{dw}{w} + s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \frac{dp_{F}}{p_{F}} \right) - \frac{dp_{F}}{p_{F}} \right)$$

$$= \left( \frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dp_{F}}{p_{F}} \right) \frac{\text{Imports}}{VA} \sum_j s_{jF} \left( 1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \right).$$

Now consider the following identity under perfect competition:

$$\text{Imports} = \sum_j \left( x_{jH} + x_{jF} \right) s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}},$$

where it says the total imports equal the sum of firms’ total input used for final output, that is, sales to domestic consumers and foreign, multiplied by the total foreign input share of

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the firm. Rearranging this equation yields the following:

$$\frac{\text{Imports}}{\text{VA}} = \sum_j s_j H s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} + \frac{\text{Exports}}{\text{VA}} \sum_j s_j F s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}.$$  

Using the trade balance condition where \( \text{Imports} = \text{Exports} \), we obtain

$$\frac{\text{Imports}}{\text{VA}} \sum_j s_j F (1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}) = \sum_j s_j H s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}.$$  

Therefore, under perfect competition we have

$$\frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dP}{P} = \left( \frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dpF}{pF} \right) \sum_j s_j H s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}$$

$$= \left( \frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dpF}{pF} \right) \text{Imports} - \frac{\text{VA}}{\text{VA} + \text{Exports}} \sum_j s_j F (1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}).$$  

A.4 Conditions under which the knowledge of the network structure becomes irrelevant

Here we outline conditions under which the knowledge of the network structure is unnecessary to compute the term \( \sum_j s_j F (1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}) \), in equation (21).

If we assume that there is no import content in the production of exports, then the total foreign input share of firm \( j \) that export, \( s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} \), should be 0. Therefore \( \sum_j s_j F (1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}) \) would simply be 1.

Alternatively, if we assume perfect competition and that there is import content being the same in both exports and domestic final demand, then \( \sum_j s_j F (1 - s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}) \) can be expressed as \( \frac{\text{Exports}}{\text{VA} + \text{Exports}} \). To see this, combine equation (30) with the trade balance condition and obtain

$$\frac{\text{Exports}}{\text{VA} + \text{Exports}} = \sum_j \frac{x_{jH} + x_{jF}}{\text{VA} + \text{Exports}} s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}$$

$$= \sum_j \frac{\text{VA}}{\text{VA} + \text{Exports}} s_{jH} s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}} + \sum_j \frac{\text{Exports}}{\text{VA} + \text{Exports}} s_{jF} s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}.$$  

From the assumption of import content being the same in both exports and domestic final demand, \( s_{jH} = s_{jF} \), we then have

$$\frac{\text{Exports}}{\text{VA} + \text{Exports}} = \sum_j s_{jF} s_{Fj}^{\text{Total}}.$$
which then yields

\[
\frac{\text{VA}}{\text{VA} + \text{Exports}} = \sum_j s_j F \left(1 - s_j^{\text{Total}} \right).
\]
B Numerical example

Here we demonstrate that economies with identical sets of aggregate exports, aggregate imports, aggregate gross production and GDP, but with different firm-to-firm network structures, can potentially generate different import content in domestic final demand. We consider two economies with both consisting of three firms. Table 8 lays out the details of the two economies. In the two economies, firm-level imports, exports, gross production, domestic sales, labor costs, and value added are the same. The only difference between the two economies are how firms allocate their domestic sales to sales to households or to sales to other firms. In Table 8, the first seven rows are identical across the two economies, but the entries for Firm-to-firm sales and sales to households differ.

Table 8: Two economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economy 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Economy 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Firm 1</td>
<td>Firm 2</td>
<td>Firm 3</td>
<td>Firm 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross production</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Sales</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor cost</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic purchases</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm-to-firm sales</td>
<td>$x_{12} = 50$</td>
<td>$x_{23} = 50$</td>
<td>$x_{23} = 100$</td>
<td>$x_{32} = 50$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales to households</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now let us compute the direct and total shares of foreign inputs, as well as the firms’ shares in household consumption. Table 9 summarizes the firms’ shares. Firms’ direct shares of foreign inputs are the same across the two economies, as firm-level imports and total inputs are the same. But because the firm-to-firm sales structure is not the same in the two economies, the total shares of foreign inputs and firms’ shares in household consumption are different.
Table 9: Direct and total shares of foreign inputs, and shares in household consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economy 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Economy 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Firm 1</td>
<td>Firm 2</td>
<td>Firm 3</td>
<td>Firm 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_{Fi}$</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_{Fi}^{Total}$</td>
<td>2/3</td>
<td>2/9</td>
<td>2/27</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_{iH}$</td>
<td>2/7</td>
<td>2/7</td>
<td>3/7</td>
<td>4/7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, we compute the import content in domestic final demand in the two economies, $\sum_i s_{iH} s_{Fi}^{Total}$. In economy 1, the import content in domestic final demand is $6/21$, while in economy 2 it is $8/21$. Because there is no leakage of imports in economy 2 to Foreign, the import content in domestic final demand is about 10 percentage points higher in economy 2.

We can also easily calculate what that implies for the real wage change of going to autarky. Under $\rho = 2$ and $\sigma = 4$,

$$\frac{\hat{w}}{P} \mid \hat{p}_{F, \rightarrow \infty} = \left( \sum_i s_{iH} \left( 1 - s_{Fi}^{Total} \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{1-\rho}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} = \begin{cases} 0.79 & \text{if economy 1} \\ 0.77 & \text{if economy 2} \end{cases}.$$  

Hence, as expected, the real wage changes are larger in economy 2.
C Data Appendix

C.1 Grouping VAT-identifiers into firms

As mentioned in the main text, all our datasets are recorded at the VAT-identifier level. We utilize ownership filings in the annual accounts and information from the Balance of Payments survey in order to aggregate multiple VAT-identifiers into firms. In the ownership filings, each enterprise reports a list of all other enterprises of which it has an ownership share of at least 10% and the value of the share. In the Balance of Payments survey, Belgian enterprises with international financial linkages have to report their stock and flows of financial links. They have to report both the international participation they own and the foreign owners of financial participation in their capital if the participation represents at least 10% of the capital. The survey is designed to cover the population of Belgian enterprises involved in international financial transactions.

We group all VAT-identifiers into firms if they are linked with more than or equal to 50% of ownership. In addition, we group all VAT-identifiers into firms if they share the same foreign parent firm that holds more than or equal to 50% of their shares. We use a “fuzzy string matching” method to determine whether they share the same foreign parent firm, by obtaining similarity measures of all possible pairs of foreign firms’ names. Lastly, in order to correct for misreportings, we also add links to the VAT-identifier pairs if the two were linked one year before and one year after. We define a firm as the group of VAT-identifiers that are directly and indirectly linked.

Given these groupings of VAT-identifiers, we then choose the “most representative” VAT-identifier for each firm. We use this “head VAT-identifier” as the identifier of the firm.\textsuperscript{40} Then, in order to make the identifiers consistent over time, we make the following adjustment: We take firms whose head VAT-identifier was not an identifier of any firm in the previous year. For such firms, if there exists a VAT-identifier within the firm which was a head VAT-identifier in the previous year, then we switch the firm identifier to that former head VAT-identifier.\textsuperscript{41}

Having determined the head VAT-identifier for each firm with multiple VAT-identifiers, we aggregate all the variables up to the firm level. For variables such as total sales and inputs, we adjust the aggregated variables with the amount of B2B trade that occurred

\textsuperscript{40}The criteria for determining the head VAT-identifier is as follows: (i) If there is only one VAT-identifier in the firm that filed all the full annual accounts, the VAT declarations, and the B2B filings, then this VAT-identifier is chosen as the head. (ii) If there are no such VAT-identifiers or multiple of them, then we choose the VAT-identifier that has the largest total assets reported. (iii) If there are no VAT-identifier that filed the annual accounts, then we choose the VAT-identifier that has the largest amount of total inputs, which is the sum of labor costs, B2B inputs, and imports.

\textsuperscript{41}If there are multiple such VAT-identifier, then we choose the “most representative” VAT-identifier, using the same criteria as above.
within the firm, correcting for double counting. For other non-numeric variables such as firms’ primary sector, we take the value of its head VAT-identifier.

The number of VAT-identifiers for firms with multiple VAT-identifiers are shown in Table 10.

Table 10: Number of VAT-identifier in firms with multiple VAT-identifiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Num. VAT-identifier</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>75%</th>
<th>90%</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C.2 Firm selection

Table 11 displays the same numbers for Table 1 with statistics for all Belgian firms added.

Table 11: Coverage of all Belgian firms and selected sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>V.A.</th>
<th>Sales</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>V.A.</th>
<th>Sales</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>714,469</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>88,301</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>782,006</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>95,941</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>860,373</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1244</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>98,745</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All numbers except for Count are denominated in billion Euro in current prices. Firms’ value added in the selected sample is computed as their sales minus imports and their purchases from other Belgian firms that are in the selected sample. Firms’ value added is from the reported values from the annual accounts. This reported value added is not necessarily the same as the value added measure used later in the quantitative analysis, which is the sales value minus imports and purchases from other Belgian firms.

C.3 Sectoral composition

Table 12 shows the sectoral composition of our selected sample. Values for value added and output are in billion Euro.
Table 12: Sectoral composition in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>V.A.</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Mining</td>
<td>2,805</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>16,577</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility and Construction</td>
<td>20,421</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and Retail</td>
<td>31,117</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>27,825</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98,745</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Agriculture and Mining corresponds to NACE 2-digit codes 01 to 09. Manufacturing corresponds to NACE 2-digit codes 10 to 33. Utility and Construction corresponds to NACE 2-digit codes 35 to 43. Wholesale and Retail corresponds to NACE 2-digit codes 45 to 47, and Service corresponds to NACE 2-digit codes 49 to 63, 68 to 82, and 94 to 96.

D Descriptive statistics

D.1 Direct and Total foreign input shares

In Figure 8, we present the histograms of both the direct and total foreign input shares, for each major sector. We also summarize statistics on these distributions in Table 13.
Figure 8: Histograms of direct and total foreign input share by firms’ sector

Notes: The black dot indicates the ending of the bar for the total foreign input share. Total foreign input share of firm $i$, $s_{F_i}^{Total}$, is calculated by solving $s_{F_i}^{Total} = s_{Fi} + \sum_{j \in Z} s_{ji}s_{F_j}^{Total}$ where $s_{Fi}$ is $i$’s direct foreign input share, and $s_{ji}$ is $j$’s share among $i$’s inputs. The horizontal lines represent scale breaks on the vertical axis.
Table 13: Distribution of direct and total foreign input share by firms’ sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Direct Mean</th>
<th>Weighted Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Total Mean</th>
<th>Weighted Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Mining</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility and Construction</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and Retail</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The numbers for the weighted mean are calculated using total input purchases of firms as the weights.

D.2 Direct and Total export share

In Figure 9 we present the histograms of both the direct and total foreign input shares, for each major sector. We also summarize statistics on these distributions in Table 14.
Figure 9: Histograms of direct and total export share by firms’ sector

Notes: The black dot indicates the ending of the bar for the total export share. Total export share firm $i$, $r_{iF}^{Total}$ is calculated by solving $r_{iF}^{Total} = r_{iF} + \sum_{j \in W_i} r_{ij}^{Total}$ where $r_{iF}$ is $i$’s share of exports in its revenue, and $r_{ij}$ is share of $i$’s revenue that arises from sales to firm $j$. $W_i$ is the set of customers of $i$. The horizontal lines represent scale breaks on the vertical axis.
Table 14: Distribution of direct and total export share by firms’ sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Weighted Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Mining</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility and Construction</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and Retail</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The numbers for the weighted mean are calculated using total sales of firms as the weights.

D.3 Decomposition of real wage change

Table 15 shows the numbers analogous to those of Table 2, but in first-order approximations. Under a first-order approximation (see equation (20)), we can also decompose the log-change in the real wage upon a 10% increase in the foreign price into two multiplicative terms: the log-change in the domestic nominal wage and the foreign price as well as the level of import content in domestic final demand, \( \sum_j s_j H_{jF} \). Table 16 shows that the import content in domestic final demand is about 2 percentage points higher in the two alternative models. In the data, firms with higher export intensities tend to have higher input shares on foreign inputs. Our baseline case is able to capture this heterogeneity, while the two alternative models cannot. This difference results in the alternative models predicting larger import content in domestic final demand.

Table 15: Log-changes in real wage upon 10% increase in foreign price, direct and indirect effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Indirect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dP}{P} )</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The number for Direct is computed by replacing \( s_{jF}^{Total} \) in equation (20) with the direct foreign input share, \( s_{Fj} \). The number for Indirect is computed by replacing \( s_{Fj}^{Total} \) in equation (20) with the indirect foreign input share, \( s_{Fj}^{Total} - s_{Fj} \). The nominal wage change \( \frac{dw}{w} \) is the same across the three columns and computed according to Online Appendix A.4.
Table 16: Log-changes in real wage upon 10% increase in foreign price, decomposition using equation (20)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Simple Roundabout</th>
<th>Sectoral Roundabout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dp_F}{p_F} )</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>-0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sum_j s_j H S_j^{Total} )</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>0.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dP}{P} = \left( \frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dp_F}{p_F} \right) \sum_j s_j H S_j^{Total} )</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D.4 Back-of-the-envelope calculations of the changes in real wage

In Table 17 we present the first-order approximated changes in real wage that are computed from the back-of-the-envelope calculations motivated by Hulten (1978). Notice that all calculations lead to noisy estimates compared to the baseline result in Table 16.

Table 17: Back-of-the-envelope calculations of the changes in real wage, upon 10% increase in foreign price

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No import content in exports</th>
<th>Same import content in exports and domestic final demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(- \frac{dp_F}{p_F} = -0.1 )</td>
<td>(- \frac{dp_F}{p_F} = -0.1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>( \frac{\text{Imports}}{\text{VA}} = 0.817 )</td>
<td>( \frac{\text{Imports}}{\text{VA+Exports}} = 0.449 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \frac{dw}{w} - \frac{dP}{P} )</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The third row is computed as (1) \times (2). The first column computes the real wage change under assumptions of perfect competition and no import content being in the production of exports. The second column computes the real wage change under assumptions of perfect competition and same import contents in both exports and domestic final demand. Both calculations in the two columns also assume no change in the nominal wage, \( \frac{dw}{w} = 0 \).